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INTRODUCTION
As tort liability has greatly expanded over the past forty years, • the
1 By expansion of tort liability, I mean, expansion of the scope of tort liability, that is,
enlargement of the range of acts that can give rise to tort liability. This process has taken place
throughout the twentieth century but it accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s, and quickened in the
1980s. Indeed, thousands of tort claims brought in the 1980s and thereafter, have resulted in
defendants' retroactive inculpation for acts occurring in the 1940s and 1950s which were
nontortious at the time. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee
Lawyers: Competing Data And Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. at n.l (forthcoming
November 2003) [hereinafter Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates\, see also Lester Brickman, On
the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes are Principally
Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755 (1994) [hereinafter
Brickman, Tort System Outcomes]-, Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market
In Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 Wisc. L. REV. 859, 874, 875 n.56 (2002) [hereinafter Scales,
Market For Tort Claims] (referring to the "profound expansion in tort liability that has occurred
during the past few decades" and conjuring up a Rip Van Winkle spouse who time-travels from
the 1950s to the present and is "amazed to learn that she had acquired obligations to protect
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consequent wealth transferred has increased exponentially.^ The
impetus for this expansion is multi-faceted and complex.^ In part, the
expansion has been a function of changes in substantive tort law
favoring liability,'^ the contraction of defenses to tort liability,^ and
changes in procedural rules giving plaintiffs' lawyers broad pretrial
discovery powers.® The effects of these changes have been magnified
by enormously increased asset pools available to plaintiffs seeking
compensation for tortious behavior"' as well as by the vastly increased
criminal trespassers from harming themselves on her property, warn neighbors of the sexual
predations of her spouse, or prevent people from misusing purchases so as to harm themselves")For further discussion of the expansion in the scope of liability of the tort system, popularly
known as "the litigation explosion," see sources cited in Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths
Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 739 n.l (2002) [hereinafter Kritzer, Seven
Myths\
2 Although it is difficult to directly measure the amount of wealth transferred under the tort
system, surrogates for the quantum of wealth transfer exist. One such surrogate is total tort
system costs. In 1960, U.S. tort system costs totaled $32.3 billion (adjusted for inflation to year
2001 dollars). In 2001, tort system costs reached $205.4 billion, an increase of 536% since 1960.
See U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE app. I (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002).
2 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DBPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001)
(presenting a remarkable analysis of legal, political, financial, social and economic trends that
have aggrandized the power of the plaintiffs' bar and subtended the increase in the scope of tort
liability).
" One of the most significant of the many changes in substantive law is the development of
the doctrine of strict liability making manufacturers liable for a wide Variety of injury-producing
products. This, in turn, has led to emergence of plaintiff friendly products liability litigation,
which, however, would not have come about without the rise of mass production and distribution.
See id. at 190-92.
5 See id. (noting the disappearance of municipal and charitable immunity thus allowing
ordinary negligence actions to be brought against, for example, a charitable hospital; and the
replacement of the contributory negligence doctrine, which once provided an absolute defense, by
comparative fault).
6 See id. at 194-95. Yeazell argues that modem products liability law is largely derivative of
changes in discovery rules. The 1938 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure armed
plaintiffs' lawyers with broad pretrial discovery powers. Ironically, the costs of such discovery
were initially daunting for plaintiffs' lawyers but after several decades, they "recapital[ized]
themselves to the point where they could take cases deep enough into discovery to realize some
of the potential gain from such pretrial preparation." Id. at 195. Yeazell then asserts that it was
this procedural change that caused much of the substantive change:
Had there not been a regime of pretrial discovery, it would not have been worth
developing a law of products liability. Without pretrial access to engineering studies,
intemal memoranda, and the like, decisions about appropriate safety levels in relation
to known technology and cost would have been difficult to make.
Id.
7 Those increased asset pools include automobile insurance, the volume of which has grown
dramatically due to credit enabled consumer purchases of automobiles and mandatory auto
insurance requirements; home owner's insm-ance, which similarly has grown due to credit
enabled access to housing (which is often government sponsored) and the pronounced trend
toward home ownership; healthcare provider liability insurance; and increased govemment
funded and employer funded health insurance, which, along with technological advances, leads to
greater demand for medical services, which in tum give rise to higher rates of tort claiming. See
id. at 187-90. Furthermore, since medical costs rise faster than inflation, medical suits have
become comparatively more attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers, who are working for a
share of the total damage bill. Put another way, insurance and health care research
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financial strength of the plaintiffs' bar^ and the relative decrease in the
financial strength of the defense bar.^
While the rate of inerease in wealth transfers declined in the past
decade, more recently, tort system costs have resumed historic growth
rates that prevailed in the 1960-88 period.In fact, projections of
future growth indicate a doubling of tort costs over the next ten years.
The enormity of the quantum of wealth transferred to date and the
consequent costs imposed on the economy have spawned the tort reform
wars'2 and can only be expected to have an increasing impact on the
debate as the costs of the tort system mount.
Virtually all tort claiming is financed by plaintiff lawyers through
the medium of contingent fees. Since these fees are assessed against the
quantum of wealth transferred, the enormous increases in the amounts
of wealth transferred under the aegis of the tort system have redounded
have made tort suits more attractive investments for plaintiffs. Making them more
attractive for plaintiffs has made them a growth industry for the insurance industry and
for the defense bar. Litigation has achieved a symbiotic relationship with the most
significant aspects of the consumer credit market.
Id. at 190. In asbestos litigation, comprehensive general liability policies issued to the
manufacturers and installers of asbestos-containing products and their corporate successors were
rewritten by judicial fiat to create tens of billions of dollars in insurance coverage. See Lester
Brickman, On The Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between
Scholarship And Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. at nn.57-58 (forthcoming December 2003) [hereinafter
Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation], Because some insurers had issued policies that did
not set aggregate policy limits, the asset pool thus created may approach or even exceed $50
billion. See id. atn.59. See also lefftey O'Cormell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health
Insurance: A Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1306-08 (1994) (demonstrating that
expansion of social and private insurance inflates the cost of tort liability and concluding that the
likely extension of health insurance to broader segments of the population may be expected to
lead to increased wealth transfer under the tort system).
^ See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 199-205 (noting that specialization has led to both increased
retention of intellectual capital and to increased referrals and fee splitting, which in tum helps
ensure that a given case will be well financed by making its way to the top of the secondary
market in tort claims maintained by the plaintiffs' bar; and noting further that the plaintiffs' bar
has gained access to increased lines of credit through traditional banking loans to firms and
through firm loans directly to clients). See also Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Justice on Loan, 19
CAL. LAW. 39, 40 (1999) (noting that plaintiffs' firms ability to carry lawsuits through lengthy
discovery have been augmented by access to what has become routine bank loans, and that
Citibank Private Bank in San Francisco "finances more than 400 firms and 25,000 attomeys
nationwide").
' See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 197-98 (noting that insurers have closely scrutinized and
constrained their defense litigation costs).
10 See U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 1 (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002) ("[T]he growth
in tort costs experienced in 2001 is in stark contrast to the moderate rate of growth experienced in
the past decade and is more akin to the double-digit growth rates experienced in the decades of
the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s.").
11 The projection for 2000-2005 is based on Tillinghast's estimate of an annual tort cost
increase of 9 percent for that period. See id. Projections for the period 2006-2010 are based on a
phone conversation with Ross Sutter at Tillinghast. Telephone Interview with Ross Sutter,
Tillinghast (Nov. 5, 2002).
12 For a discussion of the tort reform wars, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note
1, app. E.
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to the financial benefit of plaintiff lawyers. Elsewhere, I have estimated
that contingent fees in tort cases are generating upwards of twenty-two
billion dollars in annual income and are increasing at a substantial
rate.'^ The resultant increased financial capacity of the plaintiff s bar
may thus be seen as simply reflecting the success of that bar in vastly
enlarging the scope of tort liability. Viewed from this conventional
approach, the dynamic relationship between the increases in tort
liability and contingent fee incomes is apparent; increasing incomes
have enabled lawyers to undertake financing of larger scale tort
litigation, thus generating increased revenues which support larger
investments in tort claiming.
Few scholars who have addressed the issue of tort litigation have
considered whether a major causative element of the expansion in tort
liability is the substantially increasing yield from contingent fees
realized by the plaintiffs bar. In part, this may be due to a failure to
perceive how lucrative contingent fee claiming has become. Over the
past forty years, the average effective hourly rate of the contingent fee
bar has increased, in inflation-adjusted dollars, by 1000 to 1400%.''^
Moreover, a top tier consisting of approximately 25 to 30 percent of the
torts bar is able to obtain effective rates of return of thousands of dollars
an hour; when these fees are obtained in cases where the lawyer has
undertaken no meaningful risk,i5 they are properly referred to as
windfall fees.'®
The enormous increases in the effective hourly rates of the
contingent fee bar parallel the enormous expansion of tort liability.
While it cannot be gainsaid that the huge profits being generated by
contingent fee claiming strongly underpin the process of expansion of
tort liability, which is the chicken and which the egg is a proposition of
considerable importance to the issue of civil justice reform and, in
particular, to tort reform. If the substantial increase in the profitability
13 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, atn.117. Other commentators have
calculated that contingent fees in tort cases are significantly higher than $22 billion, and in fact,
total nearly $40 billion per year. See CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN
INSTITUTE, TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003 2
(2003). The Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute arrived at this total by
"multiplying the 19 percent tort cost share of plaintiffs' attomeys times the $205.4 billion overall
tort cost [which includes both self insured, i.e., uninsured, tort costs and insured tort costs]." Id. at
n.4. This formula was based on a recent Tillinghast-Towers Perrin report on tort system costs,
which estimated that plaintiffs' attomeys' fees account for approximately 19 percent of total tort
costs. U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 17 (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). TillinghastTowers Perrin defined insured tort costs to include "first party benefits (the cost of legal defense
and claims handling), benefits paid to third parties (claimants and plaintiffs) or their attomeys,
and an administrative, or overhead, component... [and] includes costs associated with all claims,
not just those that reach the courthouse." Id.
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A.
15 Id. at nn.l09, 152 and text accompanying n.l24.
16 Id. atn.l3.
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of contingent fee claiming is a primary factor accounting for the
enormous expansion of tort liability and the consequent increases in
wealth transferred, as I have argued,'^ then that has profound
implications for our civil justice system and for the ongoing tort reform
debate.
For example, those who conclude, as a matter of their political
calculus, that the quantum of wealth transfer is excessive, may wish to
reconsider their current focus on reforming the tort system by changing
tort doctrines and rules of civil procedure. Instead, they may be well
advised to shift their focus to a consideration of how lawyers have been
able to increase their profits from tort claiming by such a substantial
margin. Indeed, if it is the profits that are a primary force driving the
expansion of tort liability, then the means of financing most tort
litigation in the United States requires a far more searching and
systematic inquiry than has yet been undertaken, irrespective of where
one stands on the issue of tort reform. Any such inquiry must
necessarily focus on whether the increased profits reflect increases in
opportunity costs or, alternatively, reflect returns above competitive
rates, that is, rents'^—a product of a noncompetitive market. If the
market for tort claiming services is determined not to be competitive,
then the focus of the inquiry must shift to analyzing the factors
accounting for the market failure, including identifying structural
impediments to the operation of a competitive market and, as well,
remediating actions that can be undertaken. Such an inquiry must also
focus on whether self-correcting market mechanisms that might
otherwise arise are unavailing because of coordinated efforts by lawyers
to prevent competition. Such efforts might include collusive actions to
maintain uniform pricing and the bar's use of its self-regulatory
authority to insulate tort claiming from competitive forces that would
otherwise reduce rents. If that inquiry further leads to the conclusion
that competitive market conditions cannot arise absent regulatory
intervention, then current tort reform efforts may be seen as
substantially misdirected because they focus on symptoms rather than
causes. In addition, regulatory agencies with authority to investigate
and prosecute coordinated efforts by professionals to prevent price
See generally Brickman, Tort System Outcomes, supra note 1.
18 Rents or monopoly rents are the earnings yielded by restrictions on competition. See
generally ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION:
COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 189, 293-94 (3d ed. 1983). See also DAVID BEGG,
STANLEY FISCHER & RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, ECONOMICS 146-48 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS] (Monopoly rents, also called supernormal profits or monopoly profits,
are the pure profits yielded as a result of the non-competitive nature of monopolies. Whereas the
competitive firm maximizes profits at the equilibrium price determined by supply and demand,
the monopolist is able to decrease quantity and increase price to a quantity that exceeds its output
costs without the threat of losing business to competitors. Monopoly rents equal the residual
earnings after deducting the monopoly's output costs from its increased revenue.).
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competition would also find their interests implicated.
In this article, I propose to undertake such an inquiry. To set the
stage and provide an appropriate context, I set forth below a summary
statement of positions I have previously advanced regarding the
legitimacy, use and effect of contingency fee financed tort claiming.
These propositions include:
1) that contingent fees in personal injury cases are subject to
regulatory regimes and that under both ethical codes and fiduciary law,
fees are limited to "reasonable" amounts;'^
2) that because contingent fees are designed to compensate lawyers
for risk and to therefore yield higher fee payments than hourly rate or
fixed fees, the ethical validity of a contingent fee is a funetion of the
existence of meaningful risk being assumed by the lawyer;^''
3) that sinee a substantial component of the standard eontingent fee
is the premium a lawyer is charging for assuming risk and since
existence of a realistic risk regarding compensation is mandated by
ethieal codes and fiduciary principles, then it follows, a fortiori, that if
risk is present, then the risk premium must be proportionate to the risk
and the anticipated effort that will be put at risk;2i
4) that contingent fee lawyers charging standard contingent fees
are routinely overcharging some claimants because, in many instances,
the representation involves no meaningful risk of no or low recovery
and therefore the substantial risk premium in these instances yields
unearned and unethical windfall fees;^^
5) that these windfall fees often amount to effective rates of
thousands of dollars an hour;^^
6) that a hallmark of the gross overcharging that permeates
contingency fee practice is the zero-based accounting system whereby
lawyers speciously assign all tort claims a value of zero for purposes of
applying their contingent fees to recoveries even though many claims
have substantial value at the time the lawyer is retained;^''
7) that the gross overcharging of tort claimants is not only in the
interest of plaintiff lawyers but also benefits defendant lawyers, and has
received the imprimatur of the American Bar Association;^^
" Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29,44-74 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees],
20 See id. at 70-84.
2' 5ee/rf. at 94-99.
22 See id. at 70-74; see also Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.13.
23 Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 73-74, 92-93; see also Lester Brickman, ABA
Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 280-83
(1996) [hereinafter Brickman, Money Talks].
24 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note I, at n.11.
25 See Brickman, Money Talks, supra note 23, at lAl-Cl', Lester Brickman, The Continuing
Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection : Ethics 2000's Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003
U. III. L. REV., text accompanying notes 128-48 (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Brickman,
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8) that despite the routine violation of ethical rules purporting to
limit risk premiums in contingent fee claiming to amounts
commensurate with risk, lawyers are virtually never disciplined for
violation of these rules;^^
9) that contrary to the claims of many tort lawyers, the actual risk
level of most contingent fee lawyers' portfolios of cases does not justify
the substantial risk premiums that they uniformly charge;^''
10) that a principal reason why the actual risk level is far less than
that claimed is that contingent fee lawyers carefully screen their cases,
and thus prevail in close to 90 percent of the cases they accept and, in
addition, obtain reimbursement of close to 100% of all litigation
expenses they advance, including expenses incurred in the cases where
they do not prevail;^^
11) that contingent fee lawyers charge uniform prices—standard
contingent fees—varying from thirty-three to 50 percent depending on
the jurisdiction;^^
12) that charging standard contingent fees in cases of low risk or
no meaningful risk is designed to and does yield windfall fees unearned
by either risk or effort;^''
13) that empirical evidence to the effect that tort lawyers' effective
hourly rates are substantially the same as those realized by their hourly
rate counterparts is based upon trivial and misleading data and is
therefore unreliable and inaccurate;^'
14) that, nonetheless, this data is widely relied on by torts' scholars
to prove the absence of rents, and is cited by opponents of tort reform as
justification for their opposition;^^
15) that contrary to this data, effective hourly rates of contingent
fee lawyers far exceed those of their hourly rate counterparts and that, in
fact, a top tier of contingent fee lawyers comprising approximately 1/4
to 1/3 of that bar, routinely obtains effective hourly rates of thousands
of dollars;^^
16) that contingent fee lawyers engage in concerted efforts to hide
their effective hourly rates from public view;^''
17) that the efforts at concealment of both effective hourly rates
Assault on Fiduciary Protection],
26 See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the Disciplinary
System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1357
(1996) [hereinafter Brickman, Disciplinary System],
27 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, text accompanying rm.150-51.
28 See id, at n.l48, app. H.
2^ See id, aXn,\Q,
20 See id, at Tt,11,
21 See id, at nn.39-107.
22 &eW. atn.l7.
22 See id, at n.l09.
24 See id, at n.l5, app. C.
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and risk levels incommensurate with risk premiums being routinely
charged plays an important if not critical role in the tort reform wars
currently being waged;^^
18) that while most tort reform proposals that have been advanced
including those providing for: limits on punitive damages; restrictions
on choosing venue; changes in the collateral source rule, joint and
several liability, statutes of limitation, and class action procedures; are
attacked by opponents of tort reform on the ground that they contract
rights of tort claimants and thus deny "access to justice for these
claimants, other proposals to reform the civil justice system that both
implement dormant ethical and fiducial principles and protect
consumers of legal services from price gouging by lawyers and which
are not susceptible to this usual "sound bite" charge, nonetheless
generate similar opposition;^^ and
19) that the enormous increase in the effective rate of return
realized by tort lawyers from contingent fee claiming has paralleled the
simultaneous expansion in the scope of liability imposed under the tort
system."
All of these arguments, propositions, conclusions and proposals set
the stage for the question which is the focus of this article: are
contingent fees a function of a competitive market? To undertake this
inquiry, I first examine the views expressed by scholars and
commentators. I then list and analyze features of contingent fee
financed tort claiming that are indicia of the existence of a
noncompetitive market. In this article, I contend that the principal such
indicator is the maintenance of uniform pricing in the form of standard
contingent fees, generally ranging from thirty-three to 50 percent,
depending on the jurisdiction. However, while I acknowledge that
uniform pricing is consistent with the existence of both competitive and
noncompetitive markets, I conclude that in the tort claiming market for
tort claiming services, the function of uniform pricing is to generate
substantial rents. I then examine other indicia of the existence of a
noncompetitive market for tort claiming services, including: the absence
of price advertising; the enormity of the increases in effective hourly
rates over the past forty years which far exceed estimated increases in
productivity or competence; the historical derivation of the standard one
third (or higher) contingent fee; the absence of economic justification
for uniform pricing such as reductions in agency costs or transactional
costs; inelasticity in the pricing of tort claiming services in light of
highly variable production costs as highlighted by a comparison of the
responsiveness of pricing in the tort claiming market to significant
35 See id. at text accompanying nn.20-21.
36 See id. app. D.
37 See ici. text accompanying rm. 1-6.
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differences in the cost of producing specific services with the
responsiveness of pricing in the real estate brokerage market to similar
instances of highly varying production costs; and the payment of
referral fees, a phenomenon which is largely confined to the contingent
fee market, and the fact that lawyers who are willing to pay referral fees
to other lawyers refuse to share such saved commission costs when they
are directly retained by disintermediating clients.
I then examine factors which inhibit the emergence of a price
competitive market including: asymmetrical knowledge with respect to
the value of claims; the lack of sophistication of most purchasers of tort
claiming services; the utility of uniform pricing in misleading
consumers as to the risk being assumed by the lawyer; and the signaling
functions of uniform pricing including the branding of price cutters as
slackers or as inferior in quality.
I then examine the reasons for the persistence of uniform pricing in
the face of the predictions of economists applying standard economic
theory that some laivyers would undercut standard pricing thereby
generating competitive behavior that would more closely align pricing
with risk and the variable cost of producing the service. I attribute the
persistence of uniform prieing to market failures and analyze the
reasons for such failures.
Finally, I examine the actions of the bar designed to prevent a
competitive market from emerging.
These actions include the
maintenance of barriers to entry into the tort claiming market,
prohibitions against the outright purchase of tort claims and adoption of
rules of ethics effectively prohibiting price competition including
prohibitions against providing financial assistance to clients and
brokerage of lawyers' services for profit.
I.

Is THE MARKET FOR CONTINGENT FEE-FINANCED TORT CLAIMING
SERVICES COMPETITIVE: COMPETING VIEWS

Many scholars have advanced the view that the market for
contingent fee financed tort claiming services is competitive. For
example. Professor Charles Silver has contended that the contingency
fee market is "highly competitive" [and] empirical evidence shows that
plaintiffs' attorneys compete for business ... [and] strive to cut costs
and risks."38 Professor Herbert Kritzer, a leading empirical researcher,^'
Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2088-89 (2002)
[hereinafter Silver, Civil Justice], His statement, undoubtedly correct, does not parry the thrust of
the evidence I present in this article that contingency fee pricing is noncompetitive. Lawyers,
including contingent fee lawyers, compete with each other for business and strive to become more
efficient by reducing both risk and costs. However, as I later argue, they do not compete on the
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has argued that the market system is adequate to bring down
unreasonably high fees by the "obvious mechanism" of "price
advertising which would enable clients to obtain relevant information
"about fees... [to] make more informed choices.'"" Professor Mark
Galanter, a leading torts scholar and widely cited opponent of tort
reform,argued, albeit erroneously, that New York's high contingent
fees which were in the 50 percent range, but which had dropped to
approximately 33 1/3 percent in the early 1960s, had fallen victim to the
competitive market for tort claiming services due to an increased supply
of lawyers and other competitive "market forces."'*^ Contrary
views
have also been advanced.'*'' Moreover, a number of state supreme
basis of price.
Professor Herbert Kntzer has published extensively on the effective hourly rates realized
by tort lawyers. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY. .. USES AND
ABUSES ... CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN
CONTINGENT FEE (Wisconsin Inst, for Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11-8, 1995); Contingent
Fee Abuses: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(statement of Herbert Kritzer) [hereinafter Kritzer Statement]. See also Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998)
[hereinafter Kntzer, The Wages of Risk]; Kntzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1. For a critique of
Kritzer's data and conclusions, see generally Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1.
Kntzer, The Wages of Risk, supra note 39, at 308.
Id. at 307-09. Kntzer had long denied that tort lawyers' effective hourly rates exceeded
that of their hourly rate counterparts and is widely cited for that proposition. See Brickman,
Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.17. In the face of overwhelming empirical evidence, he
has come to concede that some contingent fee lawyers are able to obtain very high and potentially
unreasonable fees. See Kritzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1, at 772; Kritzer, The Wages of Risk,
supra note 39, at 304. His solution, "price advertising," however, fails. As indicated infra note
95, contingent fee lawyers do not engage in price advertising.
See, e.g.. Marc S. Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and
Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (1998) [hereinafter Galanter, Contingency Fee and Its
Discontents]; Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don V
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD L REV 3
(1986).
•*3 See Galanter, Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, supra note 42, at 470 (hypothesizing
that a drop in contingency fees in New York City from 50 percent to 33 percent was a result of
"the increase in the supply of lawyers serving individual clients, the increased competition
ushered in by the demise of fee schedules, the appearance of advertising, and a gradual increase
in the sophistication of clients"). This is patently false. The reason for the drop in contingency
fees was not a result of market forces but rather a rule promulgated by the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court to limit contingency fees in tort cases essentially to 33 and onethird percent because market forces were ineffective in limiting contingency fees and legislative
efforts to fix the runaway pricing were blocked by lawyers who controlled key legislative
positions. For more discussion of the origin of New York's rule, see infra note 105; see also
Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 106-07. In my judgment, had the New York courts
not previously limited contingent fees to a maximum of 50 percent on the supercilious grounds
that a fee of 50.1 percent would give the lawyer control over the lawsuit, the prevailing rate for
contingent fees in tort cases would have been in the 60 to 75 percent range.
*4 See, e.g.. In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 201 F. Supp.2d 861, 875-77 (2002) ("[T]he
actual market for legal services departs rather sharply from the ideal conditions under which
markets are efficient, and therefore in theory conducive to consumer welfare .... the market for
contingent legal services especially among consumers, is highly uncompetitive . . . ."); Richard
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courts, in the exercise of their authority to regulate the practice of law,
have explieitly and implicitly rejected the view that the market for tort
claiming services is competitive by imposing price caps on contingency
fees.''5
To resolve these competing views, I offer the following systematic
and, to the extent possible, empirically based analysis of the market for
tort claiming services.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR CONTINGENT FEE-FINANCED
TORT CLAIMING SERVICES
A.

Competitive Markets: A Definition

Freely competitive markets are characterized by many producers of
goods or services which have qualities that are comparable and prices
which are published and readily discovered. Consumers are fully
informed of the qualities and prices and register their personal
preferences through choices based on that perfect information.
Producers respond to the consumer demand for information by
campaigning aggressively to provide it, an effort that epitomizes
interfirm competition. Free entry and exit by firms into and out of the
industry is also a necessary eomponent of competitive markets, in order,
inter alia, to diminish incentives for existing firms to collude.'*^

W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market For
Champerty!, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 656-59 (1995) (the predominance of uniform contingent
fee rates indicates the relevant market is not competitive); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:
How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 999 (2000):
The market for lawyers is fundamentally noncompetitive. As a consequence of the
complexity of legal reasoning and procedure, the profession's derived monopoly on the
legitimate use of coercion, and the unification of the profession to serve the diverse
needs for access to law, the price of law that emerges from the free market for lawyers
is too high.
Id.
'*5 See, e.g., Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Contingent Fees), 494 So. 2d 960, 961 (Fla. 1986) ("[T]his Court expressed its belief, (possibly,
its hope) that lawyer advertising would create greater public awareness regarding attorneys' fees
and services and that competition would provide a self-regulator on fees .... [S]uch does not
appear to be the case."); Mark A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin and Irving Mark, Accidents, Money
and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22
(1961) (because the assumption that competition would prevent abuses in setting contingent fees
was not bome out. New York's Appellate Division, by rule, found it necessary to set limits on
contingent fees). See also infra note 105 for a listing of other state rules and statutes limiting
contingent fees and for further discussion of the circumstances surrounding promulgation of New
York's rules capping contingent fee rates.
46 See BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 132-34.
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The Market For Tort Claiming Services: An Introductory
Summary

While the market for tort claiming services is characterized by
many producers of the services, virtually all of the other components
necessary for the existence of a competitive market are not present. For
example, the information that the consumer of the service requires in
order to engage in price comparisons and meaningful bargaining is
largely absent. Search costs are simply prohibitive. Consumers
typically lack knowledge of the quality of tort lawyers and therefore are
imable to make effective choices based upon differing quality levels. In
addition, consumers cannot determine the prices that they are being
charged in units which are meaningful to them such as (effective)
hourly rates and have little knowledge of the value of the claims which
they are partly selling to their lawyers, the amount of risk that the
lawyer is assuming or the amount of time the lawyer reasonably
anticipates devoting to the client's matter. Tort lawyers, who are
experts in valuing claims, determining risk and estimating the time to be
required to generate a settlement or verdict, take advantage of this
asymmetrical knowledge in a number of ways. They decline to
advertise competitive pricing and instead act collusively to generate
rents by maintaining standard pricing. Lawyers' efforts to impose and
maintain standard pricing are augmented by the message that such
pricing conveys to consumers. That is, standard pricing signals to
claimants that would-be price cutters may anticipate devoting less time
to their claims or are inferior in quality and may, in either case,
therefore obtain lower settlements. Lawyers' efforts to impose standard
pricing are further augmented by an auxiliary function of standard
pricing. It is an efficacious system for exaggerating risk and thereby
justifying unearned risk premiums. Consumers, who lack sophistication
in negotiating prices with lawyers, are therefore deterred from searching
out price cutters who deviate from standard pricing and are often
mislead into believing that the risk being assumed by the lawyer
justifies the substantial risk premium that is incorporated into the
standard price.
Given the substantial absence of critical factors characterizing
freely competitive markets, it appears unlikely that the market for tort
claiming services would be price competitive. To confirm or reject this
hypothesis, I next examine the tort claiming service market, beginning
with a consideration of indicators of the lack of a competitive market.
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Indicia Of An Uncompetitive Market For Tort Claiming Services
1.

Uniform Pricing

The dominant feature of the market for contingent fee financed tort
claiming services is that pricing of lawyers' services is uniform.
Lawyers charge standard contingent fees in all personal injury litigation
ranging from 33 1/3 to 50 percent depending on the jurisdiction.''^
While deviations are not unknown, they are comparatively rare.''^ This
is especially the case when lawyers are presented with tort claims where
liability is clear, damages are substantial and the lawyer anticipates
having to devote only modest amounts of time to generate a near policy
limits settlement offer. In these matters, windfall fees amounting to
thousands of dollars an hour are obtained.^^ Seemingly in defiance of
standard economic theory, in the world of contingent fees, the more
lucrative the claim, the more inflexible the pricing.^®
47 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.10.
48 In the course of observing contingent fee practices, I have been informed by contingent fee
lawyers that they sometimes reduce their standard fees in cases where there are substantial
medical expenses and a client's net recovery is, by comparison, inadequate if not paltry. Some
lawyers contend they routinely reduce their fees in such circumstances. While such fee reductions
do exist, there is no way to determine the frequency of such reductions from currently available
data. Moreover, there is anecdotal data that in cases where fees are substantial, lawyers rigidly
maintain uniform pricing. See id. at n.l3.
49 See id.
50 For this conclusion, I rely on personal knowledge of the contingency fee market and on
anecdotal evidence amassed over several decades of close inquiry. An illustrative and not
imtypical example involves an undergroimd steam pipe explosion which spread asbestos across
the Gramercy Park area of New York City in 1989. After initially denying the presence of
asbestos, the owner of the steam pipe. Con Edison, acknowledged its responsibility. Once the
presence of asbestos was confirmed, hundreds of residents in the immediate area had to abandon
virtually all of their personal possessions and suffer displacement from their residences for
several months. See Mirey A. Navarro, Gramercy Park's Refugees Long for Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1989, at B1 (reporting that Con Edison projected costs for explosion cleanup and
reimbursements to displaced Gramercy Park area residents to be in the $30 to $40 million range
following August 19, 1989 steam pipe explosion which spewed cancer-causing asbestos
throughout the neighborhood); see also David E. Pitt, Con Edison Takes Blame in Steam Blast,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1989, (Saturday, Late ed.) § 1, at 25 (recounting the three deaths caused by
the accident, as well as the estimated 176 pounds of asbestos which were sprayed over Gramercy
Park). Shortly after the explosion, lawyers descended on hotels and other locations where
displaced residents were being housed and offered to represent them in their claims against the
utility company. See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Gear Up to Handle Asbestos Claims; Experts Say
Personal Injury, Property Claims Look Good; Outlook Grim for Psychic Trauma, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
18, 1989, at 1 (stating that shortly following the explosion, "[i]n the race to sign up clients, some
lawyers descended upon Gramercy Park Tike locusts'... peddling their ability to recover the
'sun, moon and stars'"). Though the utility had admitted liability and the claim process largely
consisted of documenting additional living costs, the value of abandoned personal possessions
and the like—^pretty much what any home owner asserting a claim against a fire insurer would do
in the event of a fire—the lawyers charged standard contingent fees of 33 1/3 percent. Fee
bargaining occurred in only one instance of which 1 am aware. In that case, a lawyer who was
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It is both a consequence of the lack of a competitive market for tort
claiming services and an indictment of our tort system that whenever an
egregious and undeniable act of medical malpractice causing severe
injury occurs, a tort lawyer will obtain a million dollar or multi-million
dollar fee^i irrespective of the effort anticipated to be required and the
value, if any, that the lawyer adds to the value of the claim as existed
when he was retained.^^ xhat is so because contingent fee percentages,
being standard, therefore do not reflect differences in risk or in the
anticipated costs for the production of the service being purchased or in
the projected returns on the lawyer's investment. A lawyer who
imdertakes to represent a severely injured claimant rendered paraplegic
or quadriplegic where the settlement value of the claim is $10 million or
more, charges the same standard contingent fee as when she represents
a less severely injured claimant where the settlement value is only a
tenth or twentieth as much though the liability risk and amount of
anticipated effort are substantially the same for both claims. The former
will usually yield a substantially higher effective hourly rate because
pricing is inflexible and does not vary on the basis of differences in risk
or the cost of production of the purchased service.
Thus, the existence of a uniform price for tort claiming services
may be seen as an anomaly and evidence of a market failure.^^ The
likelihood of success in prosecuting personal injury claims ranges from
zero to 100%. Lawyers, however, do not randomly select their cases
from among those offered by claimants. Instead, they carefully screen
claims, rejecting more than half, in particular, those claims with a low
likelihood of success or low anticipated return on their investments.^"*
among the victims, assembled a group of other victims to join with him in securing legal services.
A discounted fee in that case was negotiated. In the other representations, not even economics of
scale were shared with claimants in the form of discounted fees. No local bar association ever
publicly suggested that it would be improper, let alone imethical to charge standard contingent
fees in such circumstances. The Bar Association of the City of New York provided free
counseling for residents with regard to their legal rights. I urged the Association that as part of
their pro bono services, they inform claimants that the one third "contingent" fee being charged
was simply price gouging and that residents should be encouraged to bargain for far lower
percentages. I further suggested that the Association state that fees in excess of 10 percent were
presumptively unreasonable in light of the purely administrative nature of the claim process and
the complete absence of risk. The Bar Association did not act on either recommendation.
51 For discussion of the frequency of million dollar fees, see Brickman, Effective Hourly
Rates, supra note 1, app. F.
52 For discussion of the zero-based accounting system used by tort lawyers to justify
assessing their contingent fees against the entire recovery irrespective of whether that recovery
includes substantial value that existed prior to any value contributed by the lawyer, see id. at n.11.
53 See Richard W. Painter, supra note 44, at 657-59 (arguing that in a competitive market the
contingency fee charged by attorneys should vary based on differences in the size of claim, the
level of risk, the amount of time devoted to the case, as well as the skill of the attomey, and that
"a competitive market in which fees consistently are the same percentage of judgment or
settlement (for example, 33 percent) would be unusual").
54 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. FI.
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The screening process is so effective that lawyers prevail in 70 to 90
percent of the cases they accept and obtain nearly 100% reimbursement
of litigation expenses advanced including expenses advanced in cases in
which they do not prevail.^^ Arguably, if competitive market forces
were effectively operational in the contingent fee setting process, the
percentages charged by lawyers would come to reflect, albeit roughly,
the likelihood of success in each case.^^ In fact, the percentage fees
charged are uniform and differences in the likelihood of success in the
cases represented have no impact on the contingent percentage.^' With
few exceptions, price is unrelated to risk.
Nonetheless, the fact that contingent fees are standardized does
not, in itself, indicate that the market for contingent fee financed tort
claiming is not competitive. Indeed, the fact of uniform pricing is
compatible both with the hypothesis that the market is not competitive
and its opposite, that such pricing is the result of a competitive market
reaching an equilibrium price.
One argument advanced in support of the competitive market
model is that uniform pricing in markets is efficient, because it lowers
transactional costs and minimizes agency costs.^^ For example, in the
55 Id.
5® See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1139-40 (1970) ("Under competitive
conditions the same percentage fee would not be charged for both [high value and low value]
cases. ). Other factors would also be important, including, for example, the value of the claim,
the amount of lawyer time that would be necessary, the amount of litigation expenses that the
lawyer would have to advance and thereby put at risk, the lawyer's workload, and whether a
quick settlement, even though for a modest sum, were in the offering.
57 See supra notes 47-52. See also Hendricks v. Sefton, 180 Cal. App. 2d 526 (1960) (lawyer
quoted his personal injury fee as one-third though he had not met the potential client and was
unaware at that point of the facts in the case); F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS & RESPONSIBILITIES 21-22 (1964); Franklin,
Chanin & Mark, supra note 45, at 132; John Leubsdorf, The Contingent Factor in Attorney Fees
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 491 (1981); Note, The Contingent Fee: Disciplinary Rule, Ethical
Consideration, or Free Competition?, 1979 UTAHL. REV. 547, 553 n.34.
5^ See Saul Levmore, Commissions And Conflicts In Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real
Estate Brokers, Underwriters, And Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J. L. & ECON. 503, 505-06 (1991)
[hereinafter Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts]-, Charles Silver, Control Fees? No, Let The
Free Market Do Its Job, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A17:
One should be slow to infer a lack of competition from these facts ... the first sentence
appears in the article after the second sentence that percentages are uniform across
geographical areas, and that these lawyers charge the same percentages in all cases
even though different cases entail different risk.... Those people who understand
markets do not usually shout "conspiracy" upon discovering a uniform practice in a
trade. They realize that competition often generates uniformity that works to the
advantage of buyers and sellers. Uniform percentage fees also may be desirable
products of competition. They entail low bargaining costs, the align the interests of
lawyers and clients in contexts in which clients have difficulty monitoring lawyers'
behavior, and they enhance client confidence by equalizing lawyers' incentives across
caseloads.
Id.
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real estate brokerage market, the contingency fee is a standard
commission of 6 percent of the sale price of the house.^^ Arguably,
standard pricing of brokers' services in this market is an efficient way to
reduce agency costs, that is, the costs to principals (home owners) of
monitoring the efforts of real estate brokers.^® If commission rates were
individualized, home owners who entered into contracts with real estate
brokers for the sale of their homes would be concerned that brokers
would devote greater efforts to selling homes of owners who had agreed
to pay higher commissions. "Uniformity in rewards mitigates the
problem of conflicts among principals because joint revenue
maximization is much more certain if an agent receives similar
compensation from several principals."®' In addition, uniform pricing
of brokerage services may be seen to minimize transactional costs by
displacing more costly individualized bargaining and by reducing
search costs home by home owners.
Nonetheless, there are multiple reasons for concluding that
economic justifications for maintenance of uniform pricing in real estate
brokerage do not similarly justify uniform pricing in the provision of
contingent fee financed tort claiming. If such justifications are not
present, that is, the quest for efficiency or maximization of joint welfare
is not the underlying basis for the maintenance of uniform pricing by
contingent fee lawyers, then the alternative hypothesis that presents
itself is that uniform pricing is a quest for rents in the form of a far
larger share of the tort claiming pie.
a.

Uniform Contingent Fee Pricing Does Not Meaningfully Reduce
Agency Costs

Even if it is the case that uniform pricing of real estate brokerage
services is efficient, uniform contingency fee rates do not meaningfully

59 See Patrick Barta, Home Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2001, at R12.
^0 See Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 509 n.l2. Others see the
existence of such uniform pricing as indicative of collusion among real estate brokers. Compare
Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, The Law and Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets
in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 641, 649 (1984)
(noting that though brokerage commissions are uniform, "[i]t is difficult, nevertheless, to embrace
the conclusion that uniform prices are sufficient proof of the existence of collusion," and that "it
is not in the interest of one firm to lower prices if it knows that rival firms would follow to
maintain their market share [thus it] is in each broker's interest to maintain the status quo"), with
Bruce M. Owen, Kickbacks Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real
Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 946-48 (1977) (multiple listing services enable real estate
agents to share information and this facilitates maintenance of uniformity of prices by price-fixing
and collusion).
Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 505.
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reduce agency costs in the tort claiming services market.® This is so, in
part, because contingency fee lawyers, while charging uniform rates, do
not apply their time and capital in equal portions to each of their cases.
Instead, they allocate their time and capital as if they were charging
differential contingency fee rates. Indeed, their behavior may be best
understood if one concludes that they are, in reality, charging
substantially differentiated fees.
To diversify and control risk and generate predictable income
streams, contingency fee lawyers assemble portfolios of cases,^^
carefully screening claims^'^ and selecting only those which they expect
to generate returns at least equal to their opportunity costs. As part of
the selection process, lawyers estimate how much time will be needed
and how much capital will have to be advanced for litigation costs.®^
After selections are made, lawyers constantly reevaluate the cases in
their portfolios and rearrange their investments going forward. Cases
that appeared more promising at the outset but which depreciated in
value as the result of newly discovered information will thereafter have
less time and capital appropriated to them.®^ And conversely, cases
which promised profitable but not super profitable returns, which
appear later to be more promising, will be allocated additional time and
capital.
For a discussion of agency issues raised by contingent fee litigation, see Geoffrey P. Miller,
Some Agency Problems In Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189(1987).
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.149.
64 Id. app. H.
65 Lawyers' screening of elaims to determine whether to accept a case is not only a function
of the estimated effective hourly rate that it will yield but also of the projected eash flow from,
and degree of risk of, the current portfolio. Any portfolio of eases may be evaluated in terms of
levels of risk—a measure that is analogous to the "beta" measure of stock portfolios or other
measures of stock portfolio or mutual fund volatility. If a prospective case appears likely to
generate a high reward but is also high risk, then the decision whether to accept the case is a
function of the level of risk of the current portfolio (as well as the lawyer's own level of risk
tolerance). A lawyer will have a greater propensity for accepting a case that will require a
substantial expenditure of capital and which is high risk relative to the risk level of his portfolio if
it offers an at least commensurately high reward and his current portfolio can be expected to
generate the necessary cash flow to cover the outlays required by the new case.
66 A lawyer who discovers to his dismay that a contingent fee case that he aceepted is
insufficiently remunerative has incentive to shirk. To be sure, ethical codes require that lawyers
zealously advance their clients' interests; shirking is unethical. In reality, however, shirking is
commonplace and is only the subjeet of disciplinary proceedings when a lawyer does it
repeatedly and, as well, engages in other egregious behavior that attracts the attention of
disciplinary counsel. Client reactions to shirking are well known. They complain that they are
unable to eontaet their lawyer, that she is always "in conference," never available to take their
phone calls, does not return phone calls or letters, etc. Clients faced with such behavior
sometimes seek out other lawyers. In some jurisdictions, contingency fee lawyers who discover
that they have invested in a clunker can not only unload their burden by inducing the client to
terminate them for their inaction, but can also then assert a right to a quantum meruit fee even if
the claim is abandoned or a second lawyer takes it to trial and there is a defense verdict. See
Lester Brickman, Setting The Fee When The Client Discharges A Contingency Fee Lawyer, 41
EMORY L.J. 367, 382-85, 393-97 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Setting the Fee].
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Empirical evidence supports this view of lawyers' portfolio
strategy. In a series of federal tax cases, the courts analyzed the degree
of recovery of litigation expenses that contingent fee lawyers had
advanced in cases which they had accepted. In one case,^^ the Fifth
Circuit examined the circumstances and conditions under which the
payments were advanced and noted that the lawyers had exercised "a
high degree of selectivity" by carefully evaluating the strength of each
claim that they were representing and limiting the amounts of expenses
advanced to under the expected recovery.®^ The court noted that
"although reimbursement was tied to the recovery of a client's claim,
assistance was granted only to those whose claims would in all
probability be successfully concluded."^^ The record revealed that the
firm recovered over 96 percent of the litigation expenses that it had
advanced.^® Other firms' experiences are comparable.''' In order to
recover virtually all of the litigation expenses it advanced, these firms
necessarily differentially invested in their portfolios of cases, investing
more capital (and presumably time) in those 70 percent or more of cases
in which they prevailed than in the 10 to 30 percent in which they did
not prevail.^2
Effectively then, contingency fee lawyers perceive their cases as
generating returns measured, for comparative purposes, in hourly rates.
At any and every moment in time, as part of the process of evaluating
their portfolios' expected returns, contingent fee lawyers estimate the
projected hourly rate to be earned for each case by estimating the
amount of time to be required to generate a settlement or take the case
to trial, the settlement or trial value of the case (which takes litigation
risk into account), the lawyer's share thereof—a function of the uniform
percentage charged, and the amount of new capital to put at risk in the
Burnett V. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 9, 12 (1964), remanded, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966), cert,
denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
68 Burnett, 356 F.2d at 760.
69 Id.
^6 See id. at 759. On this basis, the court concluded that the advances were nondeductible
loans rather than deductible business expenses.
9' For cases adopting the same approach and reaching the same result as Burnett, see Monek
V. Comm'r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 582, 584 (1966), in which a lawyer recovered approximately 98
percent litigation expenses advanced, and Canelo v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 217, 218 (1969), ajf'd447
F.2d. 484 (9th Cir. 1971) (90 percent recovery). In Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.
1995), the record indicated that the plaintiff firm had prevailed in 70 percent of their cases but
recovered 80-90 percent of all expenses advanced including expenses advanced in cases where
they did not prevail.
'^2 There is additional evidence in support of the proposition that lawyers differentially invest
in cases based on the perceived likelihood of success. See, e.g., website of Advocate Capital,
Inc., available at http://www.advocatecapital.com (Advocate Capital provides loans to lawyers to
cover litigation expenses, using the "case as collateral"). Advocate Capital requires lawyers to
repay loans even if the case is lost; however, the website implies that this should not be overly
burdensome on attorneys, citing their "experience that a minimal amount of money is invested in
cases that are ultimately abandoned." Id.
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form of advances for litigation costs.
Thus, while contingency fee uniformity has an effect on the
calculation of the estimated effective hourly rate value of each case, its
effect on minimizing agency costs is marginal. Lawyers have differing
levels of incentives to invest time and money in clients' cases and do
not devote uniform efforts to advancing their clients' interests.''^
Instead, the level of effort is a function of maximization of their
effective hourly rates of return. Uniform contingency fee rates are not
designed to, and do not maximize, joint revenue.'''^ Rather, they
maximize attorneys' rents at their principals' expense.
b.

Price Inelasticity in the Face of Highly Variable Production Costs

In freely competitive markets for uniform or easily substitutable
goods or services, prices would gravitate towards an equilibrium

Cf. Kritzer, Seven Myths, supra note 1, at 11A.
lA An alternative argument can be made that while imiform pricing results in overcharging
some clients, the excessive fees thus generated subsidize other clients whose claims would not
otherwise gain representation. Therefore, while some clients net less, others net sufficiently more
so that the cross-subsidization function of excessive fees may be seen to maximize total revenues
generated by tort claiming. The overcompensation argument was approved in a once leading but
now antiquated book on contingent fees. See FREDERICK B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES
FOR LEGAL SERVICES 182 (1964) ("[T]he idea of using overcharges of some clients to offset
undercharges to others does not seem an unfair way to support a system of providing competent
legal services to clients who need them."). We recognize the overcompensation argument as a
variation of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." As George Bernard Shaw noted, taking from Peter to
pay Paul always meets with the approval of Paul. Thoughts on Business Life, FORBES, Apr. 23,
1984, at 174. It is instructive to consider in the contingent fee context just who Peter and Paul
are. Peter, of course, is the client being overcharged by attorneys' fees unjustified by the risk
borne by the attomey. It may be thought that Paul is a subsequent client with a high risk claim
who, but for the lawyer's overcharging Peter, would not gain representation. If his claim prevails,
he has surely gained a windfall—^but it is a one-time windfall. The lawyer is also a beneficiary,
claiming one-third to one-half of the gross amount. But unlike the subsequent client, the lawyer
is a repeat beneficiary. His stake in the process far exceeds that of the subsequent client.
Moreover, whether or not he accepts a subsequent client's claim is a function of the effective
hourly rate he anticipates receiving in that case. There is no bookkeeping credit that the lawyer
applies to subsidize case two because he overcharged Peter in case one. Accordingly, it is more
correct to regard Paul as the attomey who overcharges Peter and who may therefore accept a
future higher-risk case that he would otherwise be less likely to have accepted were he not flush
with the funds that were mulcted from Peter but who will only do so if he concludes that it will
generate a fee at least equal to his opportunity cost. As for the propriety of robbing Peter, an
attomey owes each and every client an obligation not to charge that client any more than a fair
and reasonable fee. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 32 n.5. Moreover, the crosssubsidization argument itself is specious because contingent fee percentages are typically set
without regard to risk (and to the extent risk is considered, cases where risk is sufficiently high
that a one-third to one-half contingency fee offers insufficient compensation, are simply not
taken). In other words, in cases where risks are not commensurate with and do not justify
charging standard contingent fee rates, contingent fee lawyers typically "rob" each such client
without allocating any of the booty to later clients.
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pointJ' Inefficient producers would tend to be forced out of the market
and the costs of production of efficient producers would tend towards
uniformity. The market for tort claiming services, however, is quite
different. There is enormous variation in the costs of production of, and
the rates of return realized from, tort elaiming services. One claim may
present substantial risk, a need for a high investment level but very high
reward possibilities; another may present identical risk and reward
probabilities but require only a modest investment. Still another may
involve little or no risk, a need for little investment and high promise of
reward, thereby generating an antieipated windfall fee. In a competitive
market the prices charged by producers of these services would vary on
the basis of differenees in production costs and anticipated rewards.^^
However, prices for tort claiming services do not vary. They are
standard in a community and generally range from 33 to 50 percent.'"'
Because low cost, very high return claim representation is priced the
same as higher cost, lower return claim representation, the former
generate substantial rents.
To be sure, levels of risk assumed do not vary over the entire risk
continuum. As has been pointed out, in assembling their portfolios of
cases, contingent fee lawyers carefully screen claims, rejecting more
than half of those offered and selecting only those which they anticipate
will yield a return at least equal to their opportunity c o s t s . T h a t
lawyers thus screen out high risk-low reward cases does not detraet
from the proposition that prices do not vary on the basis of substantial
anticipated differences in produetion costs—as they would, at least to
some extent, in a competitive market.

Equilibrium price is the price at which, in a competitive market, the quantity supplied
equals the quantity demanded. When price lies above this equilibrium, sellers must decrease the
price in order to increase demand, thereby enabling sale of a quantity for which profits cover
output costs. Likewise, when price lies below the equilibrium, demand exceeds supply and
sellers are able to increase price until the equilibrium price is reached. See BEGG ET AL.,
ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 32-34. Thus, substantially uniform pricing is a feature of some
competitive markets. For example, gasoline prices in a given locality congregate around an
equilibrium price. Id. When price of a uniform product diverges among competitors, the
interaction of supply and demand in the competitive free market provides an incentive to change
prices towards the equilibrium price. The competitor that sells at the lowest price will have the
greatest demand. However, to meet that demand, it will have to increase supply and in turn
increase its output costs. At a certain price below equilibrium, output costs will exceed profit,
creating an incentive to decrease supply in order to increase price toward that of the equilibrium.
Id.
26 See supra note 56.
22 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 63-66.
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c. Price Rigidity in the Face of Variable Costs and Rewards: A
Comparison of Uniform Pricing in the Tort Claiming Market and the
Real Estate Brokerage Market
As with tort claiming services where pricing is uniform, real estate
brokers charge a standard contingent fee: a 6 percent sales commission.
As considered above, there is some basis for concluding that uniform
brokerage service pricing is efficient in that it reduces both agency costs
and transactional costs,''^ even though, as noted, these arguments do not
apply to the tort claiming market.^" Other differences in the two
markets may also be usefully explored. In particular, the considerable
differences in the responsiveness of each fee setting process to
competitive pressures, and the opportunity in the respective markets to
negotiate individualized prices in place of standard ones. If real estate
brokerage rates represent an equilibrium price that, on average, provides
reasonable compensation to brokers, then a projected rate of return that
is substantially higher may result in negotiation of a lower price because
the added transactional costs of negotiating a more individualized
bargain are thus justified. If uniform contingency fees are not an
equilibrium price but are, instead, a collusively maintained price
designed to generate market rents, then we would expect lawyers to
reject bargaining out of the standard rate even when a substantial rate of
return, disproportionate to risk, is anticipated. Both expectations are
borne out by industry practices.
In the case of expensive homes, instead of the standard 6 percent
brokers' commission, a lower rate, 5 percent and even 4 percent, is
usually charged.^' This reflects the fact that the increased compensation
from selling an expensive home for a standard commission may not be
justified by any increased amount of work to be done by the broker.
Accordingly, the parties bargain for an individualized rate reflective of
the specific elements of those transactions. This is decidedly not the
case in the tort claiming market. In the comparable case for tort
lawyers, that is, where the lawyer's expected retum is substantial
because of the seriousness of the injury, the absence of meaningful
liability risk and the likelihood of settling the claim without the need for
a substantial time expenditure, attempts to secure a lower contingency
fee are generally rebuffed.^^ This, too, indicates the absence of a
See supra note 58.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 61-73.
81 See Hamiah Pons, Banishing The "B-Word": Your Broker as Selling Partner, THE

COOPERATOR, Nov. 2002, at 18, 19.

82 One occasionally finds anecdotal evidence that because of family ties, tort lawyers will
discoimt rates but there is no evidence that this practice is widespread. Moreover, as has been
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competitive market.
An additional comparison of the sensitivity of uniform pricing in
each industry to competitive pressures further supports this conclusion.
In the case of brokers, competitive pressures have significantly
impacted commission rates.^^ poj- example, recent developments in the
use of the Internet have produced a 25 percent lowering of standard
commissions.^'* Lawyers' standard contingency fee rates, however,
remain unaffected by the Intemet. Indeed, if contingent fee lawyers
were threatened with similar kinds of competitive pressures as are now
affecting real estate brokers, they would simply bar the potentially
competitive structure.^^
Contrast the absence of price advertising by contingent fee
lawyers^^ with the following advertisement:^'
noted, in cases where the client ends up with an insubstantial recovery after payment of
substantial medical expenses, lawyers do discount their fees. See supra note 48. However, this is
not the case when windfall fees are anticipated or obtained. See text accompanying supra notes
48-52.
^3 Most homes sellers know by now that the traditional 6 percent real estate commission has
basically become the "suggested list price" for real estate listings. And while most brokerage
firms still push for a 6 percent commission, the amount the seller and broker finally agree upon
can end up being considerably less.
Beyond the traditional, full-service brokerage firms, a number of companies now offer
their services at a variety of commission levels, fixed charges or some combination of
the two. The levels of service vary widely, and may or may not provide inclusion on
the local multiple listing service. Competition for the home seller's business is taking
many forms.
"Commission price wars between full-service brokerages have infiltrated real estate
markets across the country," ... a Miami real estate consultant, wrote in Realty Times,
an Intemet based real estate joumal. "In an effort to gamer a larger swath of market,
attract attention and aimihilate the competition, many brokerages are slashing fees by
25 percent or more."
Jay Romano, Under 6 %, What Do Sellers Get?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at RE5.
^4 "Discount real-estate brokerages have been operating on the Web for years. However,
their growth has been severely restricted in part because they generally don't have access to the
exclusive listings that members of the National Association of Realtors share." Patrick Barta,
Realtors Pressured to Cut Commissions: Low-Cost Competitors Cain Ground, Undercutting
Traditional 6% Fee; a Cash Rebate for Buyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at Bl. A Web site
has been created which has gained access to Multiple Listing Services ("MLS") by hiring local
brokers who join local Realtor associations and thus qualify for access to the MLS. This site
typically charges sellers no more than 4.5 percent in commission, a 25 percent discount off of the
standard rate. Patrick Barta, Home Rules: Real Estate Listings on the Web are Loosening the
Crip Realtors Have Long Had on the Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at R12. The success of
this venture is leading to additional such ventures. See id. "Many Realtors also are starting to
offer 'fee-for-service' plans, in which customers can do some of the home-searching on their own
and pay a reduced commission only for the Realtor services they use." Id. In addition, a
mainstream broker, Coldwell Banker, has recently introduced a web-based brokerage that offers
discounted fees in Pennsylvania and Illinois. See Barta, supra, Nov. 12., 2002.
5ee /«/ra section VI.
See infra note 93.
See advertisement posted on a Metro-North commuter train mnning between New York
City and Brewster, N.Y. (last observed on Feb. 19, 2003). See also YHD, Advertisement, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at 19 (describing "a $12 million multi-million advertising and marketing
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At 6%, are you using your friend in
Real Estate, or are they using you?
REAL ESTATE
2% Commission
1-800-call YHD YHD.COM

Over the course of thousands of advertisements by contingent fee
lawyers costing hundreds of millions of dollars, no contingent fee
lawyer has ever published even a remotely comparable advertisement.
Indeed, contingent fee lawyers do not advertise their prices.^^
d.

Referral Fees As Rents: A Product of Uniform Pricing

Though tort claims are generally not assignable and lawyers are the
only permissible partial purchasers,^^ tort lawyers maintain an exclusive
and active secondary market in tort claims. Indeed, many tort lawyers
vigorously seek out clients with the intent of selling off the claims to
other lawyers who will do the actual negotiating or litigating and who
will pay them a portion of the contingent fee.^" Commission costs, aka,
"referral fees," which typically range from 30 to 50 percent of the

campaign providing maximum exposure for listings")See infra note 95.
89 See infra section VLB.
90 See Matter of Fuchsberg & Fuchsberg, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 2003, at 21 (indicating that a well
known New York plaintiff law firm routinely pays a 50 percent referral fee). A preeminent
personal injury law firm has indicated that it pays out 28 percent of its gross fee income to
referring lawyers. Andrew Blum, Big Bucks, But. . . Cash Flow a Problem, NAT L L.J., April 3,
1989, at 1; see also Brillhart v. Hudson, 169 Colo. 329, (1969); In re Kaye, 266 N.Y.S.2d 69
(1966), vacated, 386 U.S. 17 (1967); MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS
143-46 (1968); JEROME CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 200 (1966); F.B. MACKINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 180-81(1964); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER
AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 99-100 (1974); Blackburn, Referral Fees An Abuse of the
Public Trust, 54 FLA. B.J. 235, 235 (1980) ("In most such arrangements, the referring attorney
will do almost nothing to justify any fee, although it will usually be decided in advance that he
(she) will eventually receive 40-50 percent of the total attomeys' fees."); John Grady, Some
Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LITIGATION 22-23 (Summer 1976); Frederick N.
Halstrom, Referral Fees Are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (1985) ( [Lawyers]
customarily divide legal fees in tort actions based on a percentage agreement regardless of each
lawyer's comparative efforts and cost disbursements."). See also Yeazell, supra note 3, at 203
(contending that the plaintiffs' bar has used referrals and fee splitting to achieve a network of
expertise that replicates many of the advantages of larger firms).
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contingent fee,^' far exceed typical commission costs and finders' fees
in other commercial endeavors. Were contingent fee pricing subject to
competitive forces, the lawyers who purchase the claims in the
secondary market could be expected to share some of the saved
commission costs with claimants who seek to capture at least some of
these commissions by bypassing the business finder and going directly
to the lawyer-litigator. Despite the substantial savings realized from
disintermediation, lawyer-litigators who routinely agree to pay thirty to
50 percent of their fee when the case is referred to them, just as
routinely refuse to discount their standard rates when the claimant
comes directly to them. This further evidences the existence of a
substantial rents component in the standard contingent fee.^^
2.

The Absence of Price Advertising

Competitive markets virtually always feature price (and quality)
advertising by suppliers of goods and services.jf ^he tort claiming
market were competitive, we would expect to see lawyers' advertising
their prices and offering "special" deals to attract business.^^
Contingency fee lawyers, however, do not engage in competitive fee
advertising. In fact, they simply do not mention price in their
advertisements.^^
xhey rely instead on general public knowledge that
91 Id.
92 Payment of referral fees is a phenomenon largely confined to contingency fee lawyers.
Hourly rate lawyers do not pay referral fees to other lawyers who refer clients to them (though
they may reciprocate by referring clients to lawyers who have sent them clients). The difference
in business practice is accounted for by the rents that contingency fee lawyers obtain. The market
for hourly rate fee services, is by comparison, quite competitive.
93 As noted above, a leading empirical researcher on contingent fee pricing has argued that
the market system is adequate to curb excessive pricing by the "obvious mechanism of price
advertising" so that clients could obtain relevant information "about fees... [to] make more
informed choices." See Kritzer, The Wages of Risk, supra note 39, at 308.
94 It may be argued as a counter to my argument that physicians also do not advertise prices
and that it does not therefore follow that the market for their services is not competitive.
However, most physicians' services are paid for by third party instu-ers. Consumers have become
accustomed in such a market to largely ignore price—a condition which is undergoing change.
Moreover, and most importantly, most physicians simply do not advertise at all whereas tort
lawyers advertise extensively. Those physicians that do advertise, most notably dermatologists
and podiatrists, do include the equivalent of price advertising in their ads, namely that they cut
their prices by accepting or participating widely in various medical insurance plans. If at some
point many physicians do come to widely advertise their services and do not include information
about price, then the argument would have more cogency.
95 See Jeffirey O'Cormell, Carlos M. Brown, & Michael D. Smith, Yellow Page Ads as
Evidence of Widespread Overcharging By The Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar—and a Proposed
Solution, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 423 (1999/2000) (reporting a survey of yellow page phone
advertisements which indicates that virtually no price competition exists among attomeys who
charge contingency fees). In fact, just a single ad out of the 1,425 studied, or 0.07 percent, gave
any indication whatsoever that the advertising attomey would be willing to bargain with potential
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fees are standard and amount to ione third of the recovery. For those not
so informed, a visit to a tort lawyer's office provides the following fee
information: we charge the going rate, one third of any recovery; that is
the same as what other tort lawyers charge. Though some claimants do
shop aroimd for lower pricing, they quickly find out that lawyers are
unwilling to bargain over the fee percentage.^^ As a consequence of tort
lawyers' practices, claimants are discouraged from seeking lower prices
by price shopping and bargaining because they have learned what
lawyers have intended for them to perceive: that there is an industry
wide practice of maintaining standard pricing and price shopping is
therefore futile. Indeed, the fact that fees are standard has been cited by
a state supreme court as the basis for concluding that a standard
contingency fee was fair because it was what all other plaintiff lawyers
in the community charged.®'^
3.

The Enormous Increase in Effective Hourly Rates

Also bellying the existence of a competitive market for tort
claiming services is the enormous increase in the effective hourly rates
realized by tort lawyers over the past forty years. In the 1960-2001
period, inflation-adjusted hourly rates of tort lawyers have increased
1000% to 1400%,^^ even as the risk of nonrecovery, though remaining
essentially stable, has decreased materially in products liability and
clients with regard to the fee which would be charged. See id. at 426-27, 430. See also Judyth
Pendell, Price Colluder, Esq.: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Increasingly Advertise but Rarely Compete.
And Bar Associations Shy Away from Helping Litigants Shop, FORBES, July 23, 2001, at 34
(reporting the results of an informal poll conducted by the Manhattan Institute that of six lawyer
referral services contacted, which receive approximately 400,000 calls per year, none provide
written information about fees).
It is a common practice among contingent fee lawyers to have the contingent fee
percentage included on a pre-printed standard retainer agreement used by that lawyer and to then
fill in the client's name, address and a brief description of the nature of the claim on blank lines in
the agreement before having the claimant sign it. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B.
BREMAN, THE STORY OF A CIVIL CASE: DOMINGUEZ V. SCOTT'S FOOD STORES, INC. 8 (3d ed.
2001) (a law school text listing a model contingency fee agreement in a tort claim, which includes
a preprinted portion in which the contingent fee is: "ONE THIRD (1/3)... [of] amounts received
in settlement. . . and FORTY (40 percent) per cent . . . if. . . collected . . . after suit is filed").
Most consumer organizations, for example. Consumers Union which publishes Consumer
Reports, that might be expected to represent consumers' interests in the tort claiming process by
focusing public attention on lawyers' price gouging and taking the lead in seeking rethess in the
political arena, do not do so perhaps because of their close ties to plaintiff lawyers.
'7 See Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1417, 1429-30 (1991) (describing how a state supreme court used the fact of standard
pricing—and the consequent futility of searching for competitive pricing—to justify the fairness
of a standard contingent fee; according to the court, the fact that contingency fees are standard
means that they are fair and, presumably, the conclusion that they are fair justifies their
uniformity).
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A.
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medical malpractice litigation—areas of praetiee whieh generate the
highest eontingent fees.^^ To be sure, some component of that inerease
reflects increases in opportunity costs as well as in the inereased
competence of the torts bar'"® whieh merit an inerease in the market rate
of return. But the increases in effeetive hourly rates and incomes would
appear to well exeeed any conceivable earned inerease in the market
rate of return. To conelude, therefore, that standard contingent fees
yield a eompetitive rate of return today, one would have to conclude
that (1) 40 years ago, tort lawyers were being substantially
undercompensated for risk, or (2) that there has been a substantial
inerease in the risk assumed by eontingent fee lawyers, justifying a far
higher rate of return, or (3) that current pricing of tort claiming services
has come to inelude substantial rents. There is no empirieal or other
basis for maintaining that tort lawyers were previously significantly
undercompensated; moreover, there is a considerable basis for
eoncluding that contingency fee risk has not only not increased but has
declined.'"' Accordingly, to the extent the enormous increase in
effective hourly rates exeeeds the competence-merited inereased market
rate of return of the torts bar, that excess is a function of rent-seeking
behavior.
4.

The Historieal Derivation of the Standard Contingent Fee

The final factor I advance as an indicator that the market for tort
claiming services is not eompetitive is the derivation of the standard
contingent fee. If the standard one third fee were an equilibrium price,
we would expeet to find historieal evidence of price fluctuation, both up
and down, as the equilibrium point was approached. This is deeidedly
not the case. Tracing the historieal development of the standard onethird eontingent fee eonfirms the conclusion that it did not result from
the operation of eompetitive market forces. For the better part of the
approximately 150-year-existence of contingent fees in the United
States, the percentages charged by lawyers have varied neither on the
basis of competitive pressures nor on the likelihood of success in each
case, but on the notion of what lawyers have felt comfortable charging
within the eonfines of a judicial regulatory mechanism that essentially

^ Id. app. B.
100 Cf. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, supra note 3, at 201-02 ("A glance at the 1,200page directory of the American Trial Lawyers Association, with on-line access, fields of
specialization, and cross-indexing of members, gives one a glimpse into the expertise and the subspecialization achieved by what was once a marginal, and marginally competent, group of
lawyers.").
101 See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. A; cf. supra notes 63-71.
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capped contingent fees at 50 percent.in their infancy, contingent fee
percentages were often moderate and risk reflective, in the 5 to 25
percent range.They quickly climbed to the 50 percent level and
higher, and later receded somewhat in the face of severe criticism by the
public and other lawyers.
When percentages remained unreasonably high—in the 50 percent
range—states and courts, through statutes and rules, drove the rates
down to a 25 to 50 percent level.These statutes and rules were
102 See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 30 n.l.
103 See Wylie v. Coxa, 56 U.S. 415 (1853) (the first Supreme Court opinion to approve a
eontingent fee; though there was considerable risk, the contingent percentage was 5 percent). In
Wright V. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 252 (1875), in which there was also considerable risk, the contingent
percentage was 10 percent. In Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876), the Court noted that the
usual contingent fee was 20-25 percent, see id. at 549, though in the matter before it, the fee was
5 percent. See id. at 556. In a will contest fraught with imcertainty, the contingent fee was 5
percent. See Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195 (1878) (plaintiff lawyer testified that the usual
contingent fee for collection suits was 5 percent). In a personal injury action against a railroad,
the contingent fee was 20 percent. See Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1856).
Higher percentages were also charged. See, e.g.. Bayard v. McLane, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 139 (1840)
(66 percent).
194 Report of Committee on Contingent Fee, in 1907 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
121; ANN. REP. OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DESIRABILITY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
CONTINGENT FEES FOR 1937-38 TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
294(1938):
[T]he amount of the contingent fee ... has become in the large majority of eases ... 50
percent of the recovery .... For the first two or three decades after the legalization of
the contingent fee, percentages were moderate, [sic] fifteen per cent, or twenty per
cent, of the recovery was considered reasonable. This has grown until forty per cent is
common, fifty per cent is not unusual, and sixty per cent has been known to have been
charged.
Id.
19^ Typically, these rules and statutes established sliding scales applying the largest
percentages to the initial amounts of recovery and smaller percentages to additional increments;
some simply set a maximum percentage. New York's rule essentially limiting contingent fees in
personal injury cases to one-third was first promulgated by the Appellate Division after attempts
to enaet legislation were blocked by lawyer legislators. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.7 (e)
(McKinney 2002); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, cert denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960) (upholding the
appellate division's fee-limiting rule as within the power of the court). In opposing a legislative
effort by lawyers to overrule judieially imposed restrictions on contingent fee percentages, the
New York Herald Tribune editorialized in 1960: "[T]he First Department... found that njost of
the lawyers in 150,000 contingency fees eases eaeh year were hauling down 50 percent of
amounts recovered for themselves. This, incidentally, seems to be pretty much the national
picture." N.Y. HERALD TRIE., Mar. 23, 1960, quoted in Note, A Study of Contingent Fees in the
Prosecution of Personal Injury Claims, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 197, 203 (1966).
For other states' rules and statutes limiting eontingent fees, see, for example., CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (2002) ("MICRA") (limiting contingent fees in medieal malpractice
actions to 40 percent of the first $50,000, recovered, 33 pereent of the next $50,000, 25 percent of
the next $500,000, and 15 pereent of any amount of recovery over $600,000); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-25Ic (b)(2001) (limiting contingent fees in personal injury, wrongful death or damage to
property claims to 33 percent of the first $300,000, 25 percent of the next $300,000, 20 percent of
the next $300,000, 15 percent of the next $300,000 and 10 percent of any amount exceeding
$1,200,000); FLA. STAT. eh. 73.092 (2002) (capping contingent fees in eminent domain
proceedings to 33 percent of any benefit up to $250,000 25 percent of the benefit between
$250,000 and $1,000,000, and 20 pereent of any benefit exceeding $1,000,000); OKLA. STAT. tit.
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themselves predicated on the conclusion that fee percentages were too
high and were unresponsive to competitive forces.'"^ Had regulatory
regimes not intervened to cap contingency fees at 50 percent or lower,
the standard contingent fee would, in my judgment, likely have risen to
the 60 to 75 percent range. The available historical evidence is to the
effect that the regulatorily induced one-third (and higher) standard rate
is essentially a political rather than a market-driven determination and
represents a balance of power between the various relevant actors. To
argue that it is also an equilibrium price which is the result of
competitively derived forces not only ignores its historical derivation
but also accepts that by the sheerest of coincidences, the one-third fee
also represents a competitively derived rate of return.
III.

FACTORS WHICH INHIBIT EMERGENCE OF A PRICE COMPETITIVE
MARKET: MARKET FAILURES
A.

Asymmetrical Information

In order for a competitive market to exist, consumers must be
informed of the prices being charged by service p r o v i d e r s . T h i s
information must be easily available in terms which are meaningful to
consumers; that is, the units in which the prices are stated must convey
sufficient information to enable consumers to make price comparisons.
In addition, consumers must be able to determine the relative quality
levels of the service providers vying for their business so that they can
make informed price/quality tradeoffs in selecting a provider.'®^ In fact,
however, consumers of contingency fee tort claiming services lack such
essential knowledge and experience in dealing with lawyer-providers
and are therefore disadvantaged in bargaining with such lawyerproviders for services.
5 § 7 (2003) (limiting contingent fees to 50 percent of the net recovery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2926-120 (2002) (limiting contingent fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 percent of all damages
awarded); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.221 (Vemon 2002) (limiting contingent fees in workers
compensation cases to 25 percent of the plaintiffs' recovery); WIS. STAT. § 655.013 (1986)
(limiting contingent fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 percent or 25 percent of the first $1
million depending on whether the liability is stipulated within a statutory deadline, and 20 pereent
of any amount over $1 million); WIS. STAT. § 102.26(2) (1993) (limiting contingent fees in
workers compensation cases to 20 percent of disputed benefits). In social security cases, fees are
typically limited to no more than 25 percent of back benefits up to a maximum of $4,000. See 42
U.S.C. § 406(a)(2) (2003).
106 See supra no^A5.
107 See supra text accompanying note 46.
108 Sgg ggnerally James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The
Role of Asymmetric Information In Attorney Compensation, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993).
109 See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Lit., 129 B.R. 710, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
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Consumers Lack Knowledge Of The Value Of Tort Claims

In the market for tort claiming services, awareness of price requires
knowledge of the value of claims. This is so because while consumers
are purchasing a service from the lawyer, they are paying for the service
by exchanging a share of their claims. The reasonableness of the price
of the service is therefore a function of the value of the claim being
exchanged which is itself a function of the risk being undertaken by the
lawyer. However, many tort claimants do not know whether they have
a compensable claim and most have little knowledge of the value of
their claims, or of the risk the lawyer is assuming in purchasing a share
of their claims.'That risk is itself a function of litigation risk and
what the lawyer projects placing at risk: the amount of time the lawyer
anticipates will be required to produce an adequate recovery and the
litigation costs that he will have to advance. Tort lawyers, on the other
hand, are experts in the valuation of claims and the risk involved, the
estimated time to be required and the amount of funds that they will
need to advance. This advantage redounds to the lawyer's benefit and
disadvantages the consumer with regard to bargaining over the price of
the service.'" If risk and anticipated effort is so low that charging a
standard contingency fee will likely lead to a windfall for the lawyer, he
does not, as a matter of praetice, share that information with the client
as for example, when the lawyer reasonably anticipates that, because of
the severity of the injury and the clear culpability of the alleged
tortfeasor, he will be able to obtain a substantial settlement offer
approaching policy limits after only 10-20 hours of work, generating a
("Contingent fee clients are often unsophisticated and infrequent consumers who may not be in a
financial position to pursue an alternative [fee] arrangement."). The extent of the information
asymmetry is suggested by the American Bar Fovmdation's finding that 80 percent of persons
polled "cannot identify which particular lawyer is competent to handle their particular problem.'
Peter H. Schuck, Consumer Ignorance in the Area of Legal Services, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 568, 568
(1976). See also Stephen Cillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee
Agreements With Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581, 584 (1997) (asserting that "the number
of unsophisticated clients who retain lawyers is probably greater than the number of sophisticated
clients who do so" and that "in any one year, more lawyers probably have more unsophisticated
clients than they have sophisticated ones"). "Surely, at a minimum, hundreds of thousands of
unsophisticated clients hire tens of thousands of lawyers yearly." Id. Moreover, the recently
adopted RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 3 (2000) fails to protect
unsophisticated clients from being easy pickings for lawyers.
119 See Kritzer, Seven Myths supra note 1, at 778.
I l l S e e Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 56, 66, 68-71; see also Dana & Spier
supra note 108 (examining the use of contingent fees when the lawyer has better information than
the client about the quality of the client's case); Winand Emons, Expertise, Contingent Fees, and
Insufficient Attorney Effort, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON 21, 21-23 (acknowledging the difference in
knowledge and understanding between attorneys and clients and recognizing that clients must
rely on attorneys as experts).
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windfall fee amounting to thousands of dollars an hour."^ if the client
questions whether the fee is justified in light of the size or clarity of the
claim, the lawyer can use his superior knowledge to fend off the attempt
to bargain over the fee, for example, by exaggerating risk in order to
justify the high price implicit in the standard contingent fee.^'^
2.

Consumers Lack Other Meaningful Price Information

At first blush, it seems incongruous to argue that claimants lack
knowledge of the price of lawyers' services when contingent fees are
standard. However, knowing that the lawyer is charging one third or 40
percent of the value of a claim as realized, does not yield the kind of
meaningful information that is needed for the operation of a competitive
market. In order to make price comparisons, many consumers who
purchase services effectively translate the cost of those services into a
rough hourly rate equivalent. The sign above the auto mechanic's
workshop that he charges $90 an hour for his time conveys meaningful
(but incomplete) information. The doctor who charges $100 for an
office visit is charging somewhere in the range of $400-$600 an hour
plus additional fixed fees for specific services such as x-rays, lab work,
etc. Similar calculations can be made for the plumber or the school
teacher. Consumers of tort claiming services, however, have no basis
upon which to estimate the effective hourly rate that the lawyer
anticipates receiving since this requires estimates of the value of the
claim and the amount of time to be required to produce an acceptable
settlement or to take the case to trial. Here too, it is in lawyers' self•12 SEE DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE
PAID AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 140 (1993). There is little bargaining over the terms of the
contingent fee. Most plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is the
lawyer who will inform them (and agree to a lower percentage of the take) when they happen to
have an extremely high probability of wirming. In most instances, therefore, the contingent fee is
a standard rate that seldom varies with the size of a likely settlement or the odds of prevailing in
coiuf.
•'2 See, e.g., In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 88 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Rohan v. Rosenblatt, CV
930116887S, 1999 LEXIS 2231 (Corm. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1999) (attorney's representation that
suit would be necessary to collect the proceeds of a $100,000 life insurance policy on client's
decreased wife "had no factual basis;" therefore, former client prevailed in suit to recover
$33,333.33 fee paid); Robinson v. Sharp, 201 111. 86, 92 (1903) (finding that lawyer aroused
"serious [mis]apprehensions"); In re St. John, 43 A.D.2d 218, (1974); Haight v. Moore, 37 N.Y.
Super. (5 Jones & Spencer) 161, 165-66 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1874); Ransom v. Ransom, 70 Misc. 30,
41-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), rev'd, 147 A.D. 835 (1911); Kickland v. Egan, 36 S.D. 428 (1915);
Nugent V. Moody, 271 S.W. 266 (Tex. 1925); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.
2d 107, 114 (W. Va. 1986) (lawyers "misrepresented the difficulty in obtaining t h e . . .
proceeds"); cf. United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S.
1102 (1981); Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. Va. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Iowa 1980);
Renegar v. Staples, 388 P.2d 867 (Okla. 1963). See also Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note
19, at 65; Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.l3; infra note 123.
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interest not to make such disclosures since that might induce clients to
seek to bargain for lower fees.''^ A lawyer quoting a fee of one third
may be stating that he intends to charge a substantially different
effective hourly rate than another lawyer who is also quoting a one third
fee.
Moreover, even after a settlement has been reached, tort claimants
attempting to Icam how many hours the attorney devoted to their matter
arc almost always rebuffed.Thus, a typical tort claimant agreeing to
pay a lawyer a standard one third fee has no idea, ex ante, of the amount
of the fee he is agreeing to pay, let alone of the effective hourly rate that
the lawyer is charging, and does not know the effective hourly rate he
actually paid, ex post." ^
The contingent-fee-paying consumer's substantial lack of
knowledge of the effective hourly rate that he is agreeing to pay to the
lawyer further inhibits the operation of a competitive market.
3.

Consumers Lack Knowledge Of The Quality Of Lawyering
Services

In addition to lacking knowledge of the value of their claims and
the anticipated effective hourly rates that the client is agreeing to pay,
clients lack knowledge that would enable them to assess the quality of
the lawyering services that they are contracting to hire.'^'^ When
114 See supra note 112. It is also not in contingent fee lawyers' self-interest to disclose
information about fees that would enable the public to determine their effective hourly rates of
return or actual incomes. For consideration of the "stealth" function of contingent fees, see
Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. C.
115 I am basing this conclusion in part on anecdotal data I have acquired of the type referred to
in Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at n.l3. Tort claimants who have called me
for advice in cases where they believe that the lawyer devoted very few hours to generate a very
substantial settlement, almost always indicate that they are rebuffed when they ask their lawyers
how much time the lawyer devoted to the matter. One standard answer they get from their
lawyers is: 1 don't keep time records. Persistence may generate a more detailed answer, such as;
I devoted substantial time to the matter. Id. Further persistence sometimes results in threats by
the lawyer to sue the client if he does not agree to endorse the settlement check so the lawyer can
deposit the funds into his trust account and then withdraw his fee.
116 For discussion of the stealthiness of contingent fees, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates,
iupra note 1, app. C.
112 The bar implicitly recognized the importance of such knowledge in creating a pnce
competitive environment by using its power to regulate the practice of law to disable consumers
from assembling a directory that would have constituted a step in that direction. See Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (holding
that Virginia Disciplinary Rules (D.R.) 2-102 (A)(6) of the Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility unconstitutionally inhibited the gathering of information incMent to the
publication of a legal services directory designed to assist consumers in making informed
decisions concerning selection of a lawyer). It is interesting to note that after prevailing in this
matter. Consumer Union did not thereafter proceed with its plans to gather information and
publish the directory.
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consumers lack information needed to. compare lawyers qualitatively,
they are unable to exercise the kinds of choices that consumers regular y
in price competitive markets.>i«
m addition, consumers inability
to distinguish among lawyers qualitatively inhibits
offering lower prices and consumers from choosing lower priced tort
claiming services—a subject which will be further explored later m th
make

B.

Prohibitive Search Costs

The effect of these great imbalances between claimants
knowledge levels and that of tort lawyers is to tilt the fee bargain
playing field decidedly in the direction of the lawyer. A claiman
Leking to overcome the asymmetrical information burden faces a
daunting task. As noted, tort lawyers do not engage in price advertising
let alone competitive price advertising.^'^ ^
market quickly learn, if they did not already know, that viitoally a
lawyers charge the same contingent fee percentage. The signal is clear.
aSts to obtain lower prices are simply rebuffed. Magmlymg the
search cost is the fact that most tort claimants are

motivation to develop expertise. ).

resolve the case is always negotiable. Sometimes you can negotiate a sliding scale fee
(for example, 30 percent of any recovery up to $10,000; 20 percent of any
to $50,000, etc.) Remember that there's no particular percentage of a consumer
recover that constitutes a "standard" or "official" fee.
The ^ze of the contingency fee should reflect the amount of work that will be
re^fred Vflie attorney Some cases are straightforward; others can be novel or
urertl You may want to ask whether the case is likely to settle quickly and
whether government agencies will gather significant amounts of evidence. A fe

RI=R.C.SRSIR."';I

-
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amass information about the value of their claims, the amount of time a
lawyer would reasonably anticipate being required and the quality of the
lawyers being considered, the substantial cost of doing so would have to
be justified by the savings to be realized. Any rational assessment,
therefore, has to take into account that even when armed with this
information, claimants may still not be able to induce lawyers to bargain
over fees. Thus, for the one-time purchaser of tort claiming services
who cannot amortize costs over a series of cases, standard pricing may
raise search costs from daunting to prohibitive.
Search costs are further magnified by the unique efficacy of
standard contingency fees in conveying deceptive information with
regard to risk. To be sure, many tort claims involve considerable risk
and insufficient reward. Attorneys, however, carefully screen these
claims and reject a large portion, included most denominated as high
risk.However, many claims involve little risk and relatively high
reward, generating windfall fees that can amount to thousands of dollars
an hour.'22 Jq justify their substantial fees in these cases, contingency
fee lawyers may, in the low visibility confines of their offices,
deliberately exaggerate the risk they are undertaking in these cases.
As an alternative to such expressly deceptive behavior, tort
lawyers, by collectively maintaining a standard rate, can announce to all
adhesion'"); see also Gisbrecht v. Bamhart; 533 U.S. 789, 812 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
("[I]t is uncontested that the specialized Social Security bar charges uniform contingent fees ...
which are presumably presented to the typically imsophisticated client on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis."); Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 422 ("[A] standardized form contract prepared by ... [the attorney
who] would have declined to represent... [the client] if he had not entered into the contingent
fee agreement. .. ."); Silver, Civil Justice, supra note 38, at 2088 ("[U]nsophisticated lay-persons
cannot shop for legal services intelligently."); supra note 109.
121 See supra note 65.
122 See supra notes 22-23.
123 See supra note 111. Exaggeration of risk to justify charging a substantial contingent fee
may be endemic to contingent fee financing of tort claims. In England, a modest version of the
contingent fee, called a conditional fee, has been instituted. See Colleen P. Graffy, Conditional
Fees: Key to The Courthouse or the Casino, 1 LEGAL ETHICS 70, 70-72, 79-83 (1998)
(summarizing the history of the adoption of conditional fees). Under the conditional fee system,
a lawyer can contract with a personal injury claimant to "uplift" the fee by up to 100% in
exchange for undertaking the risk of decreasing the fee by a like percentage in the event the
litigation fails. The uplift is supposed to reflect the degree of risk being assumed. This creates an
opportunity for English solicitors to exaggerate the litigation risk, thereby mulcting clients by
offering substantial uplifts in cases in which there is little or modest risk. According to an official
report, that is precisely what is occurring;
The proportion of conditional fee cases with low estimated chances of success is
surprising and raises questions about the way in which solicitors are assessing risk.
This could cast a doubt over the fairness of the entire scheme... [T]he inconsistency in
the uplift applied to cases with similar chances of success is worrying. The uplift
appears to be either too low or (more often) too high, in almost half the cases... [A]
cynical interpretation is that some solicitors might be deliberately over estimating risk
to justify charging clients a higher uplift.
Report to the Lord Chancellor by Sir Peter Middleton, GCB, Review of Civil Justice and Legal
Aid, Sept. 1997, at xii-xiii, xvii-xviii, as quoted in Graffy, supra, at 85.
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claimants that they are simply charging the standard fee that prevails in
the commimity. In addition by maintaining a substantial standard
contingent fee percentage ranging from one third to 50 percent, they
also signal to potential tort claimants that all contingency fee financed
litigation is high risk. If the case involves high risk and insufficient
reward, the lawyer simply declines to take the case. If it will generate a
substantial effective hourly rate, the lawyer presents the claimant with
his standard contingent fee agreement form. If the client believes,
however correctly, that his claim presents a low or nonexistent risk and
therefore seeks a lower percentage fee, the lawyer insists on the
standard rate because it is the standard rate.
Because all lawyers
charge the same rate, it is necessarily "fair" and comparison shopping is
therefore unnecessary.
C.

The Signaling Function of Standard Pricing

The evidence so far considered most supports the conclusion that
contingency fee lawyers maintain uniform pricing because at the levels
charged, one third to 50 percent, substantial rents are levied. It is
reasonable to conclude that lawyers maintain a uniform pricing structure
because they perceive that it is in their self-interest to do so and not
deviate, even infrequently, from the standard fee. A law firm
considering whether to undercut the standard price would recognize that
if it successfully did so, other firms would also lower their prices and
that, as a consequence, both aggregate and individual income would
fall.'25 This recognition provides a strong incentive for acting
collusively to maintain a imiform price.
By "collusive," I do not mean that lawyers meet together,
clandestinely or otherwise, to agree on a uniform price. Rather, I mean
that lawyers act in the same manner as do gas stations owners on
adjacent comers who recognize that if any of them lower the price, the
others will respond by lowering their prices. The ensuring "gas war"
will lead to lower profits for all of the adjacent owners. To avoid such
mutually destructive behavior, adjacent gas station owners consciously
collude with each other by maintaining at least near price uniformity.
Lawyers maintain a uniform price for the same reason; that is, it
maximizes revenue and also because it yields considerable rents.

124 See Vonde M. Smith Hitch, Ethics and the Reasonableness of Contingency Fees: A Survey
of State and Federal Law Addressing the Reasonableness of Costs as They Relate to Contingency
Fee Arrangements, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 215, 245 (1994) ("Often clients accept whatever
rate an attorney suggests merely because it seems to be the 'going rate,' and thus they do not
realize that they are being overcharged.").
125 Cf Phillips & Butler, supra note 60.

100

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol.25:l

Moreover, price collusion is aided by control over the practice of law
which courts have reposed in themselvesand by use of that control to
prohibit competitive behavior.'^7
The argument that lawyers are acting collusively to fix the price of
tort claiming is open to a number of objections. A collusive pricing
system maintained by a few gas station owners is easily policed. Prices
are posted and deviations are instantly identified. Thousands of lawyers
operating in the low visibility confines of their offices cannot be nearly
so sanguine that other players are maintaining the standard price.
Indeed, economists would predict that some lawyers would deviate
from cooperating with other contingent fee lawyers to maximize joint
profits by charging less than the standard price, expecting to increase
the volume o f sales sufficiently to generate higher p r o f i t s . I n
addition, lawyers who operate more efficiently or who are more
competent and therefore are able to obtain higher settlements, would
also bid prices down, driving out less efficient and less competent
lawyers. That contingent fee lawyers do not deviate fi-om standard
contingent fee pricing is therefore, under standard economic theory, an
indication that the standard price is some form of competitive marketderived equilibrium price.In that market, lawyers who charged less
would not be able to compensate for lower prices with sufficient
increased volume to generate higher profits. However, as already noted,
there is considerable evidence that the market for contingent fee
financed tort claiming services is not competitive. Standard economic
theory, however, which seeks to explain the operation of markets under

'26 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.3 (1986); Charles W.
Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (1989).
127 See infra section VI. In addition to the structural impediments and ethical restrictions
discussed infra which inhibit price competitive behavior, tort lawyers may also be reluctant to
deviate from standard pricing out of concern that they will be ostracized by fellow tort lawyers.
In addition to per group approval concerns, lawyers may also fear that courts and disciplinary
bodies would not look kindly on such fee "cheating" and would use their discretionary authority
to punish them in more tangible ways.
128 According to economic theory, in the standard supply-demand curve, the demand curve
slopes from left to right, that is, the lower the price, the higher the quantity demanded. See BEGG
ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 35. Contingent fee lawyers, like oligopolists are "tom
between the desire to collude, thus maximizing joint profits, and the desire to compete, in the
hope of increasing market share and profits at the expense of rivals." Id. at 162. If one memberfirm increases output by undercutting the standard price, consumers will substitute its services for
those of the firms maintaining the (higher) standard price. This increase in demand will yield a
rise in the price-cutting firm's profits at the expense of those maintaining the standard price, thus
creating a strong incentive to stray from the tacit agreement. See id.
129 Equilibrium price is the price at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded.
When price lies above this equilibrium, sellers must decrease the price in order to increase
demand, thereby enabling sale of a quantity for which profits cover output costs. Likewise, when
price lies below the equilibrium, demand exceeds supply and sellers are able to increase price
until the equilibrium price is reached. See BEGG ET AL., ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 32-34.
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ideal conditions, may not therefore adequately account for the
maintenance of uniform contingent fee pricing. Because deviations
from expected competitive behavior appear to be the norm and not the
exception, we need to look beyond standard economic theory to explain
an apparent market failure.
1.

Price Cutting Signals A Shirking Or Inferior Quality Lawyer

The lack of knowledge of most consumers of tort claiming services
of the value of their claims places claimants at a distinct disadvantage in
negotiating price with contingent fee lawyers. Claimants are also
disadvantaged because they caimot effectively monitor their lawyer's
services, that is, they have no realistic way of determining whether their
lawyer is shirking or otherwise acting self-interestedly in negotiating a
settlement.
These attributes of contingency fee claiming create a significant
bias in favor of maintaining standard pricing. A price cutter may indeed
be offering the same quality of service as other providers charging
standard contingent fees. But a price cutter may also be signaling that
she intends to devote fewer resources to prosecution of the claim than
price maintainers. As a consequence, a lower settlement may be
secured which yields a lower net payment to the client. When the client
is neither able to determine the competence level of the lawyer he
selects nor to verify the level of his lawyer's efforts, a rational response
is to shun price cutters and to instead pay the standard contingent fee.'^"
A related reason why lawyers who may wish to undercut the
standard rate are deterred from doing so is because clients would likely
perceive a cut rate price offer as signaling that the lawyer is inferior in
quality to price maintainers. Since the client cannot monitor the
lawyer's efforts to assure at least a reasonable quality of effort, the
decision whether to hire that lawyer may entail substantial risk. As with
a shirking lawyer, an inferior lawyer may gain a lower settlement,
generating a lower net payment to the client than a lawyer charging the
130 See Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard and Attorney
Rents, 44 J. L. & ECON. 549, 550 (2001) [hereinafter Santore & Viard]:
When attorney effort is not verifiable, contingent fees serve a dual role: in addition to
compensating the attorney, contingent fees also provide the incentive for the attorney
to put forth effort. Since attorneys put forth less effort at lower contingent fees, clients
may prefer a higher contingent fee to the one that yields zero profits. Clients are
unwilling to hire an attomey who offers a lower contingent fee, because doing so
would reduce their net recovery—^the lower level of attomey effort induced by the
contingent fee would reduce the recovery by enough to outweigh the client's larger
share of the recovery. As a result, attomeys cannot undercut this equilibrium by
offering a lower contingent fee.
Id.
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more expensive standard rate.
D.

A Comparative Analysis of Factors Affecting Pricing Of Real
Estate Brokerage and Tort Claiming Services

In summary, the market failures that account for the persistence of
standard pricing for tort claiming services include: asymmetric
information with regard to the value of tort claims, litigation risk, and
the amounts of time required for prosecution of a claim; lack of
meaningful price information; prohibitive search costs encountered by
claimants seeking to make price and quality comparisons including the
discouraging effect of those costs on consumers considering whether to
expend resources to comparison shop; the unique efficacy of uniform
pricing in misleadingly informing claimants that all cases are high risk;
and the signaling effect of uniform pricing in deterring lawyers from
competing on a price basis by deviating from standard pricing and
further deterring claimants from searching for price-cutting lawyers.
The effects of these market failures may usefiilly be examined by a
comparison of the markets for real estate brokerage and tort claiming
services.
At the outset, we can note that home owners seeking to hire real
estate brokers and tort claimants seeking to hire a lawyer face vastly
different search costs to acquire information about the price of the

131 Additional explanations exist for the persistence of uniform contingent fee rates.
According to one such explanation, contingency fee lawyers may be aided in acting in a
coordinated fashion to maintain standard contingency fee pricing by inertial social forces. "Path
dependence," an economic theory, postulates that some remediably inefficient social systems
persist because of information and public choice costs. See Stephen E. Margolis and S.J.
Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 17, 19 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). However, the empirical evidence advanced in support of
this theory is weak. Id. at 21-22. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 LOWA L. REV. 601 (2001).
Another explanation is based on a theory that law has an "expressive" function, that is, "that law
influences behavior independent of the sanctions it threatens to impose[,]" by providing "a focal
point around which individuals can coordinate their behavior." Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-51 (2000). This theory may help to
explain the persistence of standard contingency fee pricing. In a number of states, maximum
contingency fees, usually one third, are set by statute or court rule. See ROBERT L. ROSSI,
ATTORNEY S FEES § 2:10, 114-20 (2d ed. 1995). Since there is standard pricing, that maximum
fee is also, in reality, the minimum fee. Thus, the legal expression of a maximum fee "provide[s]
a focal point for coordinating individual action," by contingency fee lawyers; that is, it signals to
lawyers that by acting in a coordinated fashion, they can maintain the maximum fee as the
standard fee. McAdams, supra 1666. "[T]he state ean focus attention on one of several
equilibrium solutions to a coordination game by commanding or merely recommending that
individuals coordinate around that solution." Id. at 1663. "Each [lawyer] selects the salient
strategy [of uniform contingent fee pricing] because they expect the other[s] to do the same and
each has an interest in doing what the other[s] do." Id. at 1668.
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services to be purchased. Most home owners have an at least
approximate idea of the value of their homes; moreover, they caii
relatively easily acquire knowledge about value by consulting other real
estate brokers, neighbors, listings of properties sold and recent
appraisals done as part of refinancing mortgages. In addition, home
owners can roughly approximate the amount of time
likely have to devote to the task of selling their home.'^^ Thus, home
owners have a reasonable basis for estimating in advance the actual
price in dollars that they are effectively agreeing to pay to brokers and
can roughly approximate the hourly rates they are agreeing to pay, as
well. An agreement to pay a commission of 6 percent of the sale pnce
may therefore be seen as the substantial equivalent of an agreement to
nav a fixed price for a reasonably quantifiable service contingent upon a
sale Home owners are therefore not being misled by the use of uniform
pricing in brokerage services. They know the approximate price they
are paying in advance of contracting for the service and are therefore
able to make an informed determination whether to use the services of a
full priced broker, a discount broker or, in the alternative, rely on their
own efforts to sell their home. For these and other reasons, the marke
for real estate brokerage services is becoming increasingly
^The situation is dramatically different for tort claimants. As noted,
most tort claimants do not know whether they have a compensable
claim, let alone the value of their inquiry. They must rely almost
exclusively on the expert claim evaluator: the tort lawyer. In addition,
they lack information about the amount of work that the la^er
reasonably anticipates that she will have to do to secure an acceptable
settlement offer or to take the case to trial. Moreover, the la^er has a
clear incentive to exaggerate risk and overstate the amount of^time to be
required A typical tort claimant agreeing to pay a standard one third
fee neither knows the amount of the fee or the effective hourty rate he is
agreeing to pay ex ante nor the effective hourly rate that he has paid, ex
^^^^ The pricing in the respective markets that the two service
purchasers are entering also differs because of critical differences in the
nature of the services being purchased; in particular, qualitative
differences in skill levels and quantitative differences in the range o
each of the respective services. Sale of a home may take only weeks or
may require many months. Even so, the range of effort expended by
real estate brokers in selling a home varies considerably less than does
132 The more expensive the home, the greater the likely effort the ^rokerjnay be expected
make but this is presumably compensated for by the higher commission resulting from the higher
sale price.
133 See supra notes 83-87.
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the range of effort that a contingency fee lawyer may expend. The latter
may range from a quick settlement requiring ten hours to a protracted
settlement requiring fifty hours or more to a simple or complex jury trial
requiring 100-500 hours or more. Thus, a home owner, having some
reasonable basis for estimating the level of effort to be expended by the
broker, can make a reasonably informed decision with regard to the
price he is agreeing to pay to the broker. The tort claimant, however,
for reasons already listed, is unaware of how much he is agreeing to pay
the lawyer, how much effort the lawyer expects to devote to the matter,
the value of the claim that he is selling to the lawyer in exchange for the
service, and whether he is being mulcted by the lawyer by agreeing to
pay—as he must—a standard contingent fee of one third or more in a
case where risk may be slight and reward per unit of time may be great.
Since the reasonably informed home owner knows more or less
what degree of effort he is purchasing and the price he is paying
whereas the typical tort claimant does not, there are considerable
differences with regard to the respective opportunities for bargaining
out from the standard charge. For example, a home owner can decide to
hire a standard priced broker, or attempt to sell the property on her own
or hire a broker willing to work for a discounted fee of 2 to 5 percent. If
she does the latter, she exposes herself to at most only moderate
damage. If the broker can only produce buyers willing to pay a price
less than that sought by the home owner, the latter can fire the broker
and hire a higher priced one. The loss is substantially limited to the
value of the delay in selling the home. The limited downside as well as
the greater knowledge about the value and actual price of the services
that they are purchasing provides support for the decision of some home
owners to seek out brokers willing to discount fees.
The contrast with the tort claiming market is palpable. In addition
to knowledge level differences, the tort claimant faces a significantly
increased risk in choosing lawyer. Because the service is more
complex, it is harder to judge the quality of the lawyer and harder to
monitor what the lawyer is doing. As previously discussed, a lawyer
may decide to maximize her effective hourly rate by devoting less time
to the representation than required to obtain a substantial percentage of
the maximum settlement value of the claim, or seek a quick settlement
offer well below the maximum settlement value and then induce the
client to accept it by, for example, portraying it as the best obtainable
offer given unfavorable developments in the case of which the lawyer
was unaware when she accepted the ease.'^"^ In the alternative, a lawyer
may simply be inferior in quality because of inexperience or
incompetence and therefore lose the case at trial or generate a settlement

See Brickman, Money Talks, supra note 23, at 283-87 nn.128-48.
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offer that is substantially less than the maximum settlement value of the
claim. Since most claimants cannot monitor their lawyers' performance
and cannot evaluate the quality of the lawyer, the choice of a tort lawyer
is more potentially impactuous than the choice of a real estate broker.
Moreover, there is a res judicata effect when the lawyer is hired. If the
client loses, he cannot then go back and hire a better lawyer. In the case
of the substandard settlement offer, some clients do then terminate their
lawyers and obtain new counsel but the costs are substantial and few are
willing to persevere to that extent.
Under these circumstances, the tort claimant, unlike the home
owner, may be reluctant to seek out a lawyer willing to charge a lower
contingent fee than the one standard in that community for fear that
such a lawyer is signaling that he will shirk or that he is of inferior
quality.
The differences in search costs for the home owner seeking to hire
a real estate broker and the tort claimant seeking to hire a contingent fee
lawyer are thus substantial. These differences account, in part, for the
substantial differences in the pricing of the respective services. The real
estate brokerage market is increasingly price competitive. Standard
pricing persists, however, in the tort claiming market.
IV. ALTERNATIVE FEE-SETTING MECHANISMS THAT WOULD BE
EXPECTED TO OVERCOME THE PERSISTENCE OF UNIFORM PRICING AND
INDUCE PRICE COMPETITION
Even though the market failures previously addressed account in
some measure for the lack of price competition, they are insufficient to
explain the persistence and pervasiveness of uniform contingent fee
pricing. Absent additional factors, we would expect some lawyers to
compete on the basis of price in the tort claiming market and advertise
that they charge below market rates. In addition, we would expect a
variety of other market-based solutions to be devised that would lead to
price competition. In this section, I list a variety of ways in which price
competitive behavior may be anticipated to arise and in succeeding
sections, I consider why those projected solutions have not come to
pass.
Perhaps the most obvious, though least utilitarian, alternative
pricing mechanism that would induce price competition would be for
lawyers to offer to charge noncontingent hourly fees or fixed fees
instead of contingent fees. Indeed, ethics rulings have mandated that

135 For discussion of how the fee is set when the client terminates a contingent fee lawyer, see
generally Brickman, Setting the Fee, supra note 66.
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contingent fee lawyers offer claimants just such alternative fee
structures.It is highly likely that, in such circumstances, tort lawyers
would charge differential hourly rates, thus competing on a price basis.
This solution fails, however, for three reasons. First, even though so
mandated, tort lawyers honor that ethical requirement only in its
breach.'37 Indeed, the fact that tort lawyers violate an ethical obligation
by refusing to offer to represent clients on bases other than contingent
fees has been cited by the American Bar Association as a justification
for jettisoning the requirement—which it has recently done.'^s
Moreover, even if the requirement were to be reinstituted and enforced,
most tort claimants could not afford to pay hourly rates or fixed fees and
would therefore choose the contingent fee alternative. In addition,
claimants who could afford to pay hourly rates would nonetheless be
reluctant to choose that alternative because of their risk averseness and
agency costs. Most tort claimants would have even less ability to
monitor tort lawyers' efforts and the appropriateness of the hours
claimed by lawyers to have been devoted to the task where lawyers are
charging hourly rates as when eharging contingent fees.
Other market-based alternative structures for the delivery of tortclaiming services that may be expected to have arisen and that would be
expected to result in lawyers competing, inter alia, by offering
differential pricing, include:
1) lawyers openly bidding against each other on the basis of
price for the right to represent the claimant;
2) lawyers purchasing tort claims in their entirety from claimants
thereby eliminating all agency costs;
3) lawyers promising that they will advance part of the anticipated
recovery to clients upon being selected to represent them;
4) lawyers agreeing to provide "financial assistance" to clients at
the outset and during the pendency of claims; and
5) lawyers and other entrepreneurs, claiming expertise in lawyer
selection, offering to broker tort lawyers' services to claimants,
including bargaining with tort lawyers over fees and expenses.
With only one notable exception, these market-based alternative
fee setting arrangements have not arisen. In the next section, I consider
that notable exception—airline crash litigation—and in the succeeding
section, why that notable exception has been limited to a tiny sliver of
the tort-claiming market and why other market-based alternative fee
setting arrangements which would be price competitive, have not come
into use.
'36 See Brickman, Assault on Fiduciary Protection, supra note 25, at text accompanying
nn.106-21.
'37 Id. at text accompanying n.l21.
'38 Id. at nn.144-47.

2003]

CONTINGENT FEE TORT LITIGATION

107

V. BIDDING FOR TORT CLAIMANTS: AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION
There is one notable exception to the empirically based conclusion
that contingent fees are standard and range from one third to 50 percent,
depending on the jurisdiction: aviation accident litigation. Here
prevailing contingent fees are not standard but rather, in many cases, are
unique to each crash depending upon risk factors and are substantially
below the standard rate in all other tort litigation. An inquiry into this
highly specialized aspect of tort claiming is therefore mandated.'^9
Very few aviation accident cases are brought annually, on the order
of approximately 200.The cases are very lucrative'^i and often
involve little or no liability risk because airline companies or their
insurers often concede liability and agree to settle the claims.''*^
Lawyers compete for these lucrative cases by openly soliciting
claimants. For these reasons a handful of law firms have come to
dominate aviation accident litigation.''*^ Many aviation accident claims.
139 In addition to the sources cited in the footnotes in this section, I also rely on knowledge I
have acquired during the course of my research from conversations with lawyers. I am especially
compelled to rely on this personal knowledge with respect to fee information based on events
occurring in the last decade because there is virtually no published literature describing airline
litigation price setting practices after 1995. While trial lawyers are generally secretive about their
effective homly rates, see Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, app. H, the level of
secrecy I have encountered in seeking fee information on this subject far exceeds the already high
level that prevails in tort claiming. See, e.g., Julie Kay, Sad Dilemma: A Year After Attacks, Most
Victims and Their Families Remain Uncertain About Best Venue for Seeking Redress, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting that "a veteran plaintiff lawyer" refused to
disclose the contingent fee that he was charging families of 9/11 victims).
140 See JAMES S. KAKALIK, E. KING, M. TRAYNOR, P. EBENER & L. PICUS, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 88 (Rand, 1988) [hereinafter
KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION].
141 See Andrew Blum, The Aviation Bar Splits Over Turf, NAT'L L.J., March 20, 1989 at 1
("settlement amounts are growing ... [t]he average award in the 1987 Northwest Airlines crash in
Detroit is projected to be $1 million, a far cry from the $362,943 found in a 1988 RAND Corp.
smdy
"). In tort trial cases terminated by trial in U.S. district courts in 1996-97, of 41 such
cases described as "personal injury - airplane," the median award was $937,000, far higher than
the median for "product liability" cases. See Bulletin, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 1996-97,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Feb. 1999, at p. 5. Of the 16 plaintiff verdicts in "airplane" cases,
43.8 percent were $1 million or more. Id.
142 See KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 70-71
("[Tjhere is virtually always someone who is liable for an aviation accident. ... Typically, the
defendants either agree among themselves about how to divide expenditures for compensation
and litigation, or they agree to let the outcome of one trial decide the division of liability."). See
also Blum, supra note 141, at 1 ("[M]ost [aviation crash] suits are settled after the airline admits
liability.").
143 See ELIZABETH KING & JAMES P. SMITH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOLLOWING AIRPLANE
CRASHES 11 (Rand, 1988) ("small number of plaintiff attorneys have specialized in aviation
accident cases"); KAKALIK ET AL.. AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 41
(fourteen plaintiffs' firms handled most of the sampled cases). For a list of the top lawyers and
firms specializing in aviation law, see Who's Who In Aviation Law, NAT'L L.J., March 20, 1989,
at 30.
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however, are solicited by lawyers who do not specialize in that field of
litigation but who intend to sell the claims to one of the dominant firms
in exchange for a referral fee.'"'''
Before competition for these cases became the norm, standard
contingent fees prevailed. Over the past thirty-five years, for reasons to
be set out, contingent fees have declined steadily, averaging
approximately 20 percent in the mid-1980s''^^ and declining somewhat
further since then.^^^
One leading law firm establishes a price for each crash based upon
its unique circumstances, including the number of passengers, the nature
of the crash, the potential defendants, whether liability will be
contested, and if it is, then the particular liability risk perceived; for a
crash involving a significant number of victims where liability has been
conceded, this law firm has charged rates of 12 to 14 percent,
Other
See, e.g., Charles Maher, Crashes & Disasters, 5 CALIF. LAW 39, 41 (1985) (quoting an
aviation lawyer that "solicitation by unqualified lawyers has become commonplace"); Kakalik, et
at, Aviation Aecident Litigation, supra note 140, at 46:
Many of the claims handled by plaintiff aviation litigation specialists are referred to
them by other attorneys. Frequently the referring attorney is the family lawyer or a
friend of the decedent or the decedent's relatives or has some preexisting business or
professional or personal relationship with them
Sometimes the referring attorney has no preexisting relationship with the
decedent or the claimants, but through advertising, publicity, or some other means has
obtained several cases and wishes to refer them to an aviation specialist or involve such
a specialist at some point. In this instance, the referring attorney usually insists on a
portion of the total fee and may negotiate with one or more specialists to obtain the
most profitable arrangement. Aviation specialists reported demands by such attomeys
for as much as one-half the total fee.
Id .
See Maher, supra note 144, at 40 (1985) ([CJontingency fees "have dropped in 10 years
Ifom 35 percent to about 15 to 20 percent, mainly beeause of the [Tenerife] letter and approaches
taken to make prompt compensation."); Andrew Blum, Air Crash Death Average: $ 362,943,
NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1988 (noting that in a Rand Corporation study from 1970 to 1984, claimants'
attomey fees in 950 cases in which they were available averaged 21.5 percent). See also Jerry
Gleeson, Father-Son Legal Team Turns Tragedies into Triumphs, JOURNAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 2002
(noting that Rreindler & Kreindler, the leading aviation liability law firm typically gets
contingency fees below 25 percent "because the number of victims in airline disasters tends to run
higher").
146 See Bruee L. Hay, Contingent Fees And Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 525-27
(1996) [hereinafter Hay, Agency Costs] (stating that average contingency fees in aviation
accidents are 17 percent as "[ajviation cases involve high potential damages, liability (and the
extent of the plaintiffs' injury) is generally clear and frequently uncontested, and few defendants
are involved in the ligitation"). See also Kay, supra note 139, at A1 (reporting that "according to
published reports" most plaintiff lawyers representing victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks
on New York City take contingency fees of 10 to 20 percent); Tim O'Brien, Cracks in the
Plaintiff Bar s Solidarity: Sept 11 Survivors Caught Between Competing Brands of Legal Advice,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 1, 2002 ("The going rate [for lawyers representing September
11 claimants] is a contingency fee of 10 percent to 15 percent
").
147 Xhis information was provided by a leading airline crash litigator in a private conversation
at a conference on eontingent fees. These percentages generate effective homly rates that I
estimate to amount to $5,000-$10,000. See also Ed Bean, Damage Control: After 137 People
Died In Its Texas Jet Crash, Delta Helped Families: Fut When Some Then Sued, It Investigated
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firms charge rates ranging from 15 to 25 percent depending on
particular circumstances of each crash and the number of clients they
represent in that matter.'48
The competitive pricing structure that has evolved in aviation
accidents is a consequence of two phenomena unique to these claims,
competitive bidding by lawyers and a settlement letter sent to victims
families by the major airline insurer (the "Tenerife Letter.")
When there is a commercial aviation accident, the names of the
victims of the crash are made available by the airlines shortly thereafter
and are often published in the press.'^^ Immediately after a crash some
lawyers or their representatives show up at the location which the airline
has made available as an assembly point for grieving family members,
to offer their condolences and solicit clients.'^o others simply telephone
the victims' families several days later to do the same.'5' This
competition for extremely lucrative cases generates bidding wars in
which lawyers undercut the prices quoted by competitors.'^2
the Dead; A Life Reduced to Dollars; Scott Ageloff, Homosexual, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, '986, at
lA (quoting Robert Alpert that fees in aviation crash cases "can work out to $10,000 per hour ).
When the claims are solicited by lawyers who will be selling the claims to the dominant firms, the
former tack on a percentage to the prices set by the dominant firms that will be their part of the
fee.
148 See supra note 145. While I have been able to determine that law firms credit efficiencies
of scale by decreasing contingent fees when they obtain additional clients in the same crash, 1
have not been able to determine whether these same firms go back to clients they previously
entered into retainer agreements with and offer them the lower contingency fee rates they charge
subsequently. The intensely secretive nature of the fee setting process impedes obtaining such
information. By contrast, tort lawyers in other areas of practice almost never share efficiencies of
scale with claimants. See, e.g., supra note 50 (noting the account of the aftermath of t e
imderground steam pipe explosion in the Gramercy Park area of New York City).
149 See Kaklik, et al.. Aviation Accident Litigation, supra note 140, at 56 (names of victims
published in the newspaper).
, .
,
.
150 See, e.g., Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at 136. It is yet unclear what the
impact of the 1996 Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act will have on this phenomenon. The
Act comprises numerous provisions designed to protect and assist victims and their families in the
aftermath of aviation accidents inside the United States. Among the provisions is a prohibition ot
unsolicited communication by lawyers, their agents or potential parties to related litigation:
Unsolicited communications—In the event of an accident involving an air carrier
providing interstate or foreign air transportation and in the event of an accident
involving a foreign air carrier that occurs within the United States, no unsolicited
communication conceming a potential action for personal injury or wrongful death
may be made by an attorney (including any associate, agent, employee, or other
representative of an attomey) or any potential party to the litigation to an individual
injured in the accident, or to a relative of an individual involved in the accident, before
the 45th day following the date of the accident.
49 U S C § 1136(g)(2) (2003). Giving teeth to the above provision is an enforcement mechanism
allowing civil actions for its violation by either the National Transportation Safety Board or the
Attomey General. 5ee 49 U.S.C. § 1151 (2003).
151 See, e.g., Eric S. Roth, Confronting Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims,! GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS, 967, 971-72 (1989) (citing complaints of victims' families of solicitation ranging from
twenty to over fifty unknown attomey contacts per victim).
152 See Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Law: Solicitation, N.Y.L.J., Aug 5, 1985, at 1
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Price competition has also been engendered by the use of the
"Tenerife Letter" which was first sent in 1977 to victims' families,
expressing the airline's condolences, offering immediate tangible
assistance to cope with the effects of the tragedy,^53 and stating:
You may find yourself under pressure to sign a eontingent fee
retainer with an attomey whereby his fee is a pereentage of the final
award. The rationale for such a percentage fee is that the lawyer
risks getting no fee if there is no recovery. There is no such
contingency in this case. There is nothing to be gained by a
precipitous lawsuit. We do suggest that it would be in your best
interest to evaluate the offers which will be made to you and obtain
the help of your attomey based upon a fee for the work involved
rather than a percentage fee of the award.
Immediate legal action is unnecessary to avoid permitting
applicable time periods (i.e., statutes of limitations, etc.) to expire.
Should discussions not ultimately result in an amicable resolution of
any claims that might exist, we provide a reasonable extension of
any applicable time limitation based upon the facts and
circumstances of the individual case in order that you will have
ample time to take any path you choose as to counsel you retain, the
basis upon which he is paid or whether you wish to institute a
lawsuit. Please do not be mshed into limiting your altematives or
committing yourselves needlessly to an inordinate legal expense.
While the ostensible purpose of the letter is to present an offer by
the airline's insurer to settle the case directly with representatives of the
victims and bypass lawyers, the sub rosa purpose is to lower settlements
costs by inhibiting contingent fee attomeys from using their usual zerobased accounting system to mulct clients by assigning a value of zero to
the claim and thus applying the standard contingent fee to the entire
amount of the recovery.'^s victims' representatives, having in hand,
substantial offers of settlement, are likely to be extremely reluctant to
pay contingent fees applicable to the entire recovery without reasonable
("[SJolicitation in the mass-disaster context has the effect of bringing the fees down. Solicitation
means competition and information. Even the best and most skilled lawyers must respond to
competitive pressures if they want any cases."). I have been informed by a lawyer representing
defendants in aviation crash cases that in a recent crash, a claimant received sixteen calls from
plaintiff lawyers seeking him as a client. In addition to touting their wares, these plaintiff
attomeys competed by offering price reductions.
153 The Tenerife Letter was first sent by Robert L. Alpert, Senior Vice President and Director
of Claims of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., as a result of the mnway collision
between a KLM Boeing 747 and a Pan American Boeing 747 at Tenerife, in the Canary Islands
on March 27, 1977. See Randal R. Craft, Jr., Factors Influencing Settlement of Personal Injury
and Death Claims In Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. AIR. L. & COMMERCE 845, 897-98

(1981).
154 The part of the Tenerife Letter reproduced above was sent to victims' families in the July 9,
1982 Pan Am 727 jetliner crash at New Orleans Int'l Airport, and is excerpted in Randal R. Craft,
Jr., The Letter Should Be Sent, THE BRIEF, Nov. 1982 at 4, 7.
155 See supra text accompanying note 24.
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assurance that the increments in the recoveries to be secured by the
lawyer will be sufficient to assure no net reduction in the clients' shares
of the recoveries. If the lawyer advises a client to turn down the
settlement offer and retain the lawyer to secure a higher recovery, then
it is reasonable to anticipate that many clients in those circumstances
will likely insist on limiting the contingent fee to the amount of value
which the lawyer adds to the claim.
The effects of the Tenerife Letter on contingent fee pricing were
dramatic. From its first use in 1977 to about 1985, contingent fees in
aviation accident cases dropped from about 35 percent to 15 to 20
percent.
The dean of aviation accident litigation, Lee S. Kriendler,
while strongly opposing use of the letter, acknowledged some of its
many benefits:
In one respect-plaintiff lawyers fees-the . . . [Tenerife Letter]
Approach has benefited the public. They have dropped from the
33.33 percent that prevails generally in the handling of negligence
cases to little more than half that. In the major airline cases, they
currently average about 17.5 percent.
Moreover, in some cases the plaintiff attorney's fee is based on
the excess over what the defendant offers. In a situation where the
claimant has been offered $800,000 he may be reluctant to retain a
lawyer for litigation without something close to a guarantee that he
will at least net $800,000. This has led to a variety of fee
arrangements.
The . . . [Tenerife Letter] Approach has also substantially reduced
the fees of defense lawyers. The negotiation and settlement role is
largely exercised by the central claims office of an insurer, which
imposes tight control over the process.'^^
Plaintiff attorneys have been extremely critical of the use of the
Tenerife Letter.Though it has not been found by a court or
156 See KAKALIK ET AL., AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION, supra note 140, at 45 (some
attorneys in aviation accident cases charge a contingent fee only on the portion of the recovery
that exceeds the settlement offer that preceded representation). Victim's representatives are also
inclined to exclude the in-hand settlement offer from the recovery to which a contingent fee is to
apply because they tend to be more sophisticated than the average tort claimant. This reflects air
traveler's higher socio-economic class than that of the general public. The reader who is familiar
with the "early offer" proposal that I eo-authored, see generally LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL.,
RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, Manhattan Institute (1994) [hereinafter BRICKMAN ET AL.,
RETHINKING FEES], will recognize that the Alpert Letter is a form of the "early offer" proposal.
Indeed, the Tenerife Letter was instrumental in the formulation of the "early offer" proposal.
157 See supra notes 145-46.
158 See Lee S. Kreindler, supra note 154, at 4, 38.
159 See Andrew Blum, The Aviation Bar Splits Over Turf, NAT'L L.J., March 1989, at 1, 29
("Plaintiffs' attomeys often criticize the... [use of the] Alpert Letter."); Bean, supra note 147
(quoting Robert Alpert on the aftermath of the New Orleans crash: "A lot of lawyers became
critical of us for contacting people [in New Orleans]. They said we were trying to take advantage
of people. They were concemed we were settling too many and they weren't getting their fees.");
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disciplinary agency to violate ethical rules, the depth of opposition has
led to its discontinuance by the aviation insurance industry.
Despite its discontinuance, the effects it has had on fees has
persisted. Lawyers continue to actively compete for aviation crash
clients and by so doing, engender price competition which has driven
the average contingent fee to well below the level that prevails in all
other tort litigation. The obvious question, of course, is why this
phenomenon is limited to a tiny sliver, in terms of number of clients, of
the tort claiming market. In the next section, 1 attempt to answer this
question as well as consider why other mechanisms that would lead to
price eompetition have failed to gain purchase in the tort claiming
market.
VI.

IMPEDIMENTS IMPOSED BY THE BAR TO THE ADOPTION OF
ALTERNATIVE PRICE COMPETITIVE MECHANISMS

The simple answer to why competitive pricing that has developed
in aviation accident litigation has not also developed in other tortclaiming services is that eompeting for clients by such direct
communication constitutes solicitation and is unethical,
To be sure,
it is unethical for lawyers to contaet the families of aviation accident
vietims to solicit employment by offering to cut fees. It is nonetheless
commonly done.'®i Attempts to curb such solicitation are periodically
undertaken by bar associations which resent out-of-state lawyers
coming to the scene of aviation aecidents and competing against in-state
lawyers.Moreover, as noted, federal legislation has been enacted to
curb the aetivity.'^^ Still the lure of effective hourly rates running into
the thousands and tens of thousands of dollars an hour often in instances
where liability is not contested is a powerful inducement.
Anti-solicitation rules, though ineffective to preclude price
competition in the ultra-small aviation accident market which averages
200 or so claims annually, are apparently more efficacious in curbing
price competition in the tort-claiming market where claiming levels
average 1,000,000 annually.rules are one of a number of antiCraft, supra note 153, at 899 (I98I) ("A number of aviation plaintiffs' attomeys feel strongly that
[the Alpert]... letter is improper.... No court or bar association has censured the letter or
directed that it not be sent.").
160 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.7.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
See supra noie \A9-5l.
See generally Bumele V. Powell, The Problem of the Parachuting Practitioner, 1992 U.
III. L. REV. 105.
See supra noit 150.
See Brickman, Disciplinary System, supra note 26, at n.45. To be sure, direct solicitation
of claimants is widespread in tort litigation. Nowhere has such solicitation been more widely
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competitive policies instituted by the bar to preclude price competition.
These policies are intended to prevent the rise of market mechanisms
that would otherwise arise to challenge uniform pricing.
To be sure, all occupational groups seek to institute policies
designed to limit price competition. For example, all seek to limit the
supply of their services to drive up priees and seek to justify this and
other anti-competitive strategies by invocation of the "public
interest."'®^ So too with lawyers. Over 150 years ago, lawyers fought
practiced than in asbestos litigation. Here, upwards of 1,000,000 or more present and former
industrial and construction workers have been directly solicited by screening enterprises
sponsored and paid for by lawyers. See Brickman, Theories of Asbestos Litigation, supra note 7,
at V.A. Though this is one of the most massive recruitment efforts of any kind undertaken in this
country and though the agents hired by the lawyers to solicit claimants receive substantial
payments from the lawyers, anti-solicitation rules have not been applied to lawyers engaged in
these activities. See id. at n.l07. However, though lawyers engaged in these client recruitment
efforts are obviously competing for business, they are not competing with each other on the basis
of price. If someone recruited to attend an asbestos screening sponsored by Attomey X indicates
at the screening that he has already signed up with Attomey Y, he is informed that he is not
eligible for the free screening. Id. at text accompanying n.l21. Indeed, I am imaware of any
instance where one lawyer offered to represent an asbestos claimant for less than what another
lawyer had agreed to charge the claimant. Indeed, even though tens of thousands of asbestos
claims have been paid and are being paid through administrative processes, and have required as
little as 10-15 minutes of paralegal time to process, many lawyers charge fees of 40 percent. See
id. at n.89.
165 For many years, the American Medical Association ("AMA") maintained that "it was
unethical for physicians to join partnerships or other professional relationships with nonphysicians unless ownership remained solely in the hands of the licensed physicians." American
Antitrast Institute, Converging Professional Services: Lawyers Against the Multidisciplinary Tide
The
(Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.antitmstinstitute.org/books/multidisc.cfm.
justification for these restrictions, according to the AMA, was to preserve the independent
decision making power of doctors and maintain high standards of medical care. Id. When this
mle came under attack in 1975, a federal court of appeals rejected the AMA's justification and
found that the restrictions '"had the purpose and effect of restraining competition by [nonphysicians], and restricted physicians from developing business stmctures of their own choice.'"
American Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 449 (2d Cir. 1980), ajf d by an equally divided
court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The FTC has also successfully challenged the optometry
profession's ethics regulations barring its members from establishing offices in commercial
locations (shopping centers) and from "engaging in the 'corporate practice' of optometry."
Michigan Optometric Ass'n, 106 F.T.C. 342 (1985); American Academy of Optometry, Inc., 108
F.T.C. 25 (1986).
Anticompetitive regulations under the guise of justified professional stmcturing are not
limited to the health care industry. Before the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to the
restriction, the National Society of Professional Engineers maintained an ethics mle "barring
members from engaging in competitive bidding." National Society of Prof. Engineers v. U.S.,
435 U.S. 679, 694-96 (1978). The association claimed that allowing competitive bidding would
promote cost cutting measures and thus potentially endanger public safety. Id.
The legal profession has also been formed to be subject to antitmst laws. See, e.g., F.T.C. v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that the support and publicity
provided by a lawyers' association for a group of attorneys who planned to boycott future
representation of indigent criminal defendants if the government would not pass legislation
providing for an increase in their fees as sufficient to "warrant condemnation under the antitmst
laws"). The lawyers justified their actions by claiming that the quality of the representation
would likely improve if the rates were increased. Id. at 423. The court felt, however, that this
rationale was not a justification for tmlawful restraint of trade. Id.
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to free themselves from legislative regulation of the prices they charged
to which they were then subjected/^® and to opt instead for market
based pricing. Once they achieved the right to freely negotiate prices
with their clients,
they then sought to insulate themselves from
market forces by: restricting entry to the profession; banning
competition from outside the profession; prohibiting the outright
purchase of tort claims; and adopting ethical rules to preclude price
competition, including rules prohibiting lawyers' providing financial
assistance to tort clients and the brokerage of lawyers' services.
A.

Barriers to Entry

The beginning point of any analysis of why the lack of price
competition due to the rigidity of standard contingent fee pricing has not
been counteracted by market solutions is lawyers' control over the
market for tort claims.Tort claimants who wish to finance their
pursuit by selling a percentage of their claim have a limited market.
Nonlawyers are impermissible purchasers;'®^ the contingent fee system
See Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer
Agreements In Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REV. 1037, 1046-50
(1992) (deseribing lawyers' successful attempts to evade and then repeal, legislative "fee bills"
which closely regulated their fees).
167 See Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cimningham, Nonrefundable Retainers:
Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory And Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 170-76
(1988) (discussing the adoption of 1848 N.Y. Laws § 258 and subsequent legislative history as §
474 of the New York Judicial Code, providing for the repeal of all "fee bills" regulating lawyers'
fees and providing instead that "the measure of... [a lawyer's] compensation shall be left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties").
168 Lawyers' control over the market for tort claims is part of the broader monopolistic control
exercised over the practice of law. See, e.g., Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate
Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 483 (2001); Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999).
Technically, it is not lawyers qua lawyers who regulate the market for tort claims; rather, it is
state supreme courts which have abrogated to themselves exclusive control over the practice of
law. See supra note 126. This control is often exercised by the courts to further the interests of
lawyers at societal expense. For a discussion of some of the "special rules" for lawyers that have
emanated from this control, see Brickman, Assault on Fiduciary Protection, supra note 25, at
sections VI-VIII. For purposes of this article, I use the term "lawyers' control" and "bar control"
interchangeably to refer, inter alia, to control over the practice of law exercised by courts, bar
associations, disciplinary boards and lawyers through collusive actions to maintain tmiform
pricing.
169 See Scales, Market For Tort Claims, supra note 1, at 897 (stating personal injury litigation
constitutes "a very odd market—one with only a single buyer... [and] usually only one seller").
Many states, by rule or statute, prohibit the sale (assignment) of tort claims, or categorize such
sales as champertous and therefore illegal. See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.L8, cmt. 6
(explaining that the provisions of the Model Rules that prohibit lawyers from acquiring a
proprietary interest in a subject of a pending litigation "has its basis in common law champerty
and maintenance"); see also Michael Reese, The Use of Legal Malpractice Claims as Security
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Under the UCC Revised Article 9, 20 REV. LITIG. 529, 534-35 (2001) (indicating that the UCC's
prohibition of assigning security interests in a personal injury claim is a remnant of common law
rules against maintenance and champerty). Since lawyers are able to, in effect, purchase a one
third (or more) share of tort claims via a contingent fee arrangement, only lawyers are permissible
purchasers of tort claims. See, e.g.. Title 17-A, § 516 of Maine's Criminal Code, which reads in
relevant part:
1. A person is guilty of champerty if, with the intent to collect by a civil action a claim,
account, note or other demand due, or to become due to another person, he gives or
promises anything of value to such person.
2. This section does not apply to agreements between attomey and client to bring,
prosecute or defend a civil action on a contingent fee basis ....
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516 (West 2002); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. Law § 13-101(1)
(McKinney 2002) (prohibiting transfers of personal injury claims or certain real property); OKLA.
STAT. tit.l2 § 2017(D) (2002) (prohibiting "the assignment of claims not arising out of contract");
Qi 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b) (2002) (authorizing certain assignments of claims against the United
States government to be made only "after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided,
and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued," and further requiring a series of hurdles
to make such assignment, including certification by an official). Contrast the prohibition on the
sale of tort claims to nonlawyers with the free wheeling sale of claims by lawyers as illustrated in
Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal. App. 3d 279, 282 n.2 (4th Dist. 1989).
Rules prohibiting the sale of tort claims are a subset of common law mles against alienation
of chooses in action. See, e.g., Karp v. Seizer, 132 Ariz. 599 (1982); J. B. AMES, THE
INALIENABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION, IN LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 210 (1913); Walter
W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1916); Jeffi'ey O'Connell
& Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means
of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 55 (1980). The persistence
today of vestigial remnants of these prohibitions in the form of restrictions on the assignability of
tort claims owes more to its utility as a means of precluding price competition in the tort claiming
market than fidelity to tradition or policy. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL.
L. REV. 48, 66, 72, 78 (1935).
In recent years, entrepreneurial ventures have begun providing financing to tort claimants in
exchange for a share of the recovery. One such venture states:
Injury Funds provides non-recourse financing and settlement advancement to Plaintiffs
in pending personal injury lawsuits. In simpler terms, we purchase a small percentage
of your lawsuits [sic] anticipated recovery. We do not lend money, we do not make
loans, and we do not earn interest on our investment. Instead, if the case is won, we
get a percentage of the total recovery. If the case is lost, the funds are yours to keep
and you owe us nothing.
Available at http://www.injuryfunds.com/about.shtm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Another similar
enterprise may be accessed at http://www.captron.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Both
enterprises and several others invest in tort claims by advancing nonrecourse loans (called
"investments") to tort claimants who have hired lawyers to represent them in personal injury
claims. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmidt, Staking Claims, WALL ST. J., Sep. 15, 2000, at A1
(describing the Resolution Settlement Corporation which make non-recourse loans directly to
plaintiffs and occasionally to their lawyers, based on the firm's assessment of the strength of the
case); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts For Sale, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1 (Fisk
explores the range of the now burgeoning business of investing in others' lawsuits and pointing
out that it has now become common practice to invest in individuals' lawsuits. Investors have
fiilly covered the market, beginning with wholly speculative claims that have yet to reach the
settlement table, and continuing throughout the appeals process. A large portion of the business
involves purchasing shares in previously awarded judgments that are on appeal.). Several state
bar associations have issued ethics opinions allowing lawyers to provide clients with information
about the availability of such nonrecourse loans providing that it is in the client's interest and the
lawyer has no involvement in the process except for providing the firm with access to the client's
file with the client's concurrence. See, e.g.. Professional Ethics of the Florida Bar, Op. 00-3
(March 15, 2002); Arizona Ethics, Op. 91-22 (Sept., 30 1991); New York, Op. 666 (June 1994).
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channels all tort claims sellers to one class of purchaser—the lawyeroligoponist.
By insulating themselves from
competition from
nonlawyers for the purchase of tort claims,^''' lawyers fully capture, as
one form of rent, the substantial finders' fees that lawyers pay to other
lawyers, known as referral fees,^''^ that would otherwise be shared with
nonlawyers or with clients who disintermediate and directly deal with
the lawyer-litigator. By precluding competition in the purchase of tort
claims, lawyers also facilitate minimization of price competition in the
provision of legal services to tort claimants.
B.

The Prohibition Against The Outright Purchase of Tort Claims
Most commentators agree that the most efficient fee structure—

However, bar association ethics opinions restrict their purview to ethical issues and do not opine
on matters of law. Ventures such as InjuryFunds and CapTran, by investing in causes of action
and by providing living expenses to claimants so that litigation can be carried on are engaging
both in champerty and maintenance. See GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODBS, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING 273 (2d ed. 1990). Many if not most states, however, have largely abandoned these
common law proscriptions and whether or not these enterprises will be found by courts to violate
statutory law or public policy remains to be seen.
Another legal issue raised by these ventures is whether their fee structures violate laws
against usury. The enterprises contend that though their nonrecourse loans are issued for
effective interest rates that approach the "vigorish" rates charged by loan sharks, they are not
usurious because of the non-recourse element, i.e., the risk of nonpayment in the event that there
is no recovery. That is, they are investments, not loans. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that such an advance was a loan and therefore usurious. See Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121 (2003) (The plaintiff, Rancman, was
advanced S7000 by the defendant. Interim Settlement, with repayment contingent upon successful
resolution of her underlying auto accident claim. The terms of the loan called for an eventual
return of $12,600 profit to the defendant. When Rancman settled her suit for $100,000, she
refused to pay the amount due, instead returning the principal with 8 percent interest. The Ohio
court held for Rancman, and denounced the practice of third party investment in speculative
litigation. While the court did not disclose the reason for rejecting the argument that the advance
was an investment, not a loan, it hinted that the reason was that there was little or no real risk
being borne by the defendant).
While these enterprises are experiencing substantial growth, other than the Ohio court ruling,
there has been no major movement by the bar to ban them. This may be because these ventures
constitute no threat to the bar's interests. Since the loans are only offered to claimants after they
are represented by lawyers and, on occasion, to lawyers, they therefore do not induce any
competitive behavior that threatens the bar's interest in precluding price competition; moreover,
they do not adversely affect lawyers' shares of tort recoveries. For these reasons, these ventures
are being at least tolerated by the bar. For a more detailed discussion of financial assistance to
clients by entrepreneurs, see infra note 179.
1^0 See Patrick T. Morgan, Note, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death Claims, 60 MO. L. REV. 683, 705 (2001) (restricting the partial sale of
tort claims via contingent fee arrangements creates an uncompetitive marketplace for tort claims
sellers).
'71 For further discussion of the effect of referral fee practices on the issue of the competitive
nature of the contingent fee financed tort claiming market, see supra text accompanying notes 9293.
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one that competition among contingency fee lawyers would give rise
to—is where attomeys vie with each other to buy the right to a client's
legal claim and prosecute it on their own behalf.i^^ Such a structure, as
well as other efficient fee structures that would promote competition,
are prohibited; states do not allow lawyers to purchase tort claims
outright or bid for clients^'^'^ By "restricting the [contingent] fee
arrangement to a simple percentage of the award [, the bar] prevents the

1^2 See, e.g.. Hay, Agency Costs, supra note 146, at 513 n.20 (1996); Santore & Viard, supra
note 130, at 549; Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 522-23; Marc J.
Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 331 (1987)
[hereinafter Shnkartis, Market in Tort Claims\, Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Cnrrivan,
Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 596-97 (1978).
Another efficient fee structure to both reduce agency costs and cotuiter the ethically
challenged zero-based contingent fee accounting system now in use, see supra notes 24 & 155, is
for contingency fee lawyers to bid for clients by (1) identifying an amount of recovery (x) against
which the lawyer will take a zero fee, and (2) the percentage of recovery that the lawyer will
apply to an recovery in excess of x—which could be well in excess of 50 percent. The conceptual
underpinning of this fee mechanism is set forth in Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at
94-99. It also underlies the "early offer" proposal that is referred to supra note 156. See also
Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 58, at 522 ("[T]he optimal arrangement
between lawyer and client from the perspective of reducing agency costs would be for
contingency fee lawyers to "bid for clients, with the winning lawyer naming the highest x and
receiving a standard percentage (such as 80 percent, for example) above x."}.
A variant of this fee structure was used in In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197
F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a class action suit brought against Sotheby's Holding, Inc. and
Christie's Intemational PLC and their respective subsidiaries. U.S. District Court Judge Lewis
Kaplan initially ordered that all law firms bidding to be selected as class counsel were to offer
two figures: X and a higher figure Y. Under this proposal the class would receive 100% of the
gross recovery up to and including X. The lead counsel would receive 100% of the gross
recovery in excess of X up to and including Y. The lead counsel would also receive 1/4 of any
recovery above Y with the remainder going to the class. Counsel would be selected "on the basis
of both the economic terms of the bids and the qualifications of the bidder." Id. at 73. However,
after "considering the comments of the amid and bidder," the court revised the fee structure,
requiring bidders to offer only one figure, X, where the lead counsel would receive 25 percent of
any recovery in excess of X. As in the first scenario, the court would weigh the economic terms
of the bid and the bidders' qualifications. Id. at 74. The winning bid of $405 million as X was
sufficient to secure the seleetion of David Boies and Richard B. Drubel of Boies, Schiller &
Flexner, LLP as lead counsel. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, No. 00 Civ.
0648(LAK) 2001 WL 170792 at '•'1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). A settlement award of $512
million thus yielded lead counsel a fee of $26.75 million, 1/4 of the recovery greater than $405
million, or 5.2 percent of the recovery. See 2002 WL 170792 at *19-20. It is interesting to note
that if this process were applied to selecting counsel in other class actions and it yielded similar
percentages of the recovery, then class action lawyers would lose himdreds of millions of dollars
and even billions of dollars in fee income that they are now receiving. This may explain why the
class action bar (which also includes the lawyers who defend against class actions) has attempted
to scuttle the auction approach with a broadside attack. See Third Circuit Task Force Report on
The Selection of Class Counsel, Jan. 2002.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.1.8(J); Santore & Viard, supra note 130 at 55156; Shukaitis, Market in Tort Claims, supra note 172 at 329-30. Prohibitions against bidding for
clients are typically in the form of ethical rules prohibiting providing financial assistance to
clients, see infra notes 179-82, paying anything of value to anyone for recommending a lawyer,
see MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R. 7.2(c) or operating for-profit lawyer referral services,
see infra note 185.

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

118

[Vol. 25:1

type of price competition that would... eliminate [lawyers' rents]."!^^
Whatever the historical bases for these restrictions, they are maintained
today to inhibit the competitive behavior that would otherwise be
unleashed.'''^
C.

The Use of Ethical Rules To Preclude Price Competition

From the time the first code of ethics was adopted^'^'' to the
adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1967 and
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility in 1983, a central
feature of the ethical regimes adopted by the bar has been restraint of
price competition by lawyers. But for the intercessions of the United
States Supreme Court, such essential elements of price competition as
the absence of mandated minimum fees, advertising, and group legal
services, would have remained ethically constrained.''^
Despite
175 Hay, Agency Costs, supra note 146, at 513; see also Santore & Viard, supra note 130, at
550.
176 See WOLFRAM, supra note 126, at 507; Samuel R. Gross, fVe Could Pass a Law... What
Might Happen If Contingent Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 325-28 (1998); Radin,
supra note 169, at 66.
177 The first lawyer's code of ethics was adopted in 1887 at Albany, New York. H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1953). In the same year, the Alabama bar also adopted a code. ALA. STATE
BAR ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS (1887). The anticompetitive tone of these codes was set by David
Hoffman, a leading American lecturer on law in the mid-nineteenth century. His Resolution
XXVIII provided: "I shall regard as eminently dishonorable all underbidding of my professional
brethren." 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836), reprinted in
DRINKER,
at 344.
178 Provisions requiring adherence to minimum fee schedules or restricting advertising by
lawyers—struck down by court—exemplify attempts by the bar to preclude price competition.
See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that a rule prohibiting lawyers from
advertising violates the First Amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793
(1975) (ruling that minimum fee schedules violate antitrust laws); Kenneth L. Penegar, The
Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J. 473, 477 (1992)
(stating that the bar's traditional anti-competitive practices included minimum fee schedules and
prohibitions on advertising); Deborah L. Rhode, Why The ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective
on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 702 (1981) ("A principal force animating any
occupation's efforts at self-regulation is a desire to minimize competition from both internal and
outside sources."). See generally Gregory H. Bowers & Otis H. Stephens, Jr., Attorney
Advertising and the First Amendment: The Development and Impact of Constitutional Standard,
17 MEM. ST. U. L. Rev. 221 (1987) (discussing the constitutional protection afforded to attorney
advertising before and after Bates). While the striking down of ethical rules prohibiting
advertising has led to price competition among a segment of the bar charging hourly rates or fixed
fees for certain routine services, it has not impacted contingent fee pricing.
Other examples of the bar's anti-competitive practices include entry restrictions and marketdivision strategies designed to limit competition within the profession. See Roger Cramton,
Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 551-52 (1994).
In addition, ethical provisions regulating group legal services, prohibiting the aiding of the
unauthorized practice of law and fee splitting, also seek to preserve lawyers' monopolistic control
over the dispensation of certain services and, as well, to maintain lawyers' primacy over other
professional groups. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 104; Brickman, Money
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repeated instances of the Supreme Court's striking down anti
competitive rules adopted by the bar, many restraints on competition,
expressed in the form of ethical rules endure, in particular, restraints on
financing tort claimants and on business practices and organizational
structures that would facilitate price competition.
1.

Prohibitions Against Providing Financial Assistance to Clients

One ethical rule that applies virtually exclusively to contingent fee
financed tort claiming prohibits lawyers from providing financial
assistance to clients, typically in the form of payments to clients to
defray living costs while the litigation proceeds—even if repayment is
not contingent on the outcome.jhg ostensible purpose of these
Talks, supra note 23, at 253. For an analysis of ethical rules ostensibly protecting client
confidentiality but which maximize lawyers' fees and promote fraud, see id. at 253-54.
While the focus of this article is on the offensive use of ethical rules to preclude price
competition in the contingency fee bar, defense lawyers also invoke such rules for anti
competitive purposes. For example, insurance companies have been forcing defense lawyers'
fees down by limiting legal defense costs through billing and litigation management guidelines.
Defense lawyers have struck back at these fee-depressing actions by invoking various sections of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in an attempt to declare such guidelines as unethical. In
at least one instance, a state supreme court has concurred. See In re Rules of Prof 1 Conduct and
Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000). A number of bar
associations have also opined in favor of defense lawyers' attempts to limit the ability of
insurance companies to limit their fees. See Amy S. Moats, Note, A Bermuda Triangle in the
Tripartite Relationship: Ethical Dilemmas Raised by Insurers' Billing and Litigation
Management Guidelines, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 525 (2003).
There are less obvious features of ethical codes that may be seen to advance self-interest.
For example, mles of ethics stress the obligation of the practitioner to zealously protect and
advocate clients' interests irrespective of the social costs imposed by these rules. See Robert A.
Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 J. L. & SOC.
INQUIRY l, 37, 38 (1994) (suggesting that the ethical rules stressing zealous advocacy coupled
with mles of evidence advanced by lawyers "that provide a broader and more absolute lawyerclient privilege than" exists in most countries," are imposed without "concern for legitimate
interests of third parties and society at large").
Payments to clients to subsidize living expenses and payment of clients' litigation expenses
are treated differently by the ethical codes; the former is referred to as "financial assistance" to
clients and the latter as "advancing litigation costs." Ethical codes allowed lawyers to advance
litigation costs such as filing fees, transcript costs and expert witness fees, provided the client
remained liable for repayment of the advancement irrespective of the outcome of the claim. See
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-8, DR 5-103(3) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]. This was changed when the Model Rules were adopted in 1983 to allow the repayment to
be contingent on success of the claim. See MODEL RULES, supra note 160, at R.1.8 (e) (1983).
This change simply mirrored what was already happening in practice despite the previous ethical
provision. That is, when contingency fee lawyers advanced litigation costs and the litigation
failed, in most cases, the lawyer did not seek to obtain reimbursement of these advancements as
the ethics rales would appear to have mandated.
Both ethical codes prohibit providing financial assistance to clients, that is, subsidizing
clients' living costs prior to or during the course of litigation. See MODEL CODE DR 5-103 (B);
MODEL RULES, R.1.8 (e). For a detailed analysis of the origins of the rales prohibiting financial
assistance to clients and of the policies cited in support of the rale, see James E. Molitemo, Broad
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prohibitions is to protect clients from being seduced by offers of
subsidized living costs into selecting lawyers on the basis of such offers
rather than for other more "appropriate" criteria.'s® The real reason is
prohibition, Thin Rational: The Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in
Litigation" Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223 (2003). For a sympathetic treatment of
advancement of living expenses, see Jack P. Sahl, The Cost of Humanitarian Assistance: Ethical
Rules and the First Amendment, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 795 (2003). Nine jurisdictions depart from
the general rule and allow latvyers to provide financial assistance to clients. Most, however,
carefully circumscribe their rules to prevent advances for living costs from becoming a basis for
lawyers' bidding against eaeh other to acquire clients by upping the amoimts of the loans being
offered. This is done by limiting advancements to only those who have already become clients
and by other provisions designed to preclude price competition. The most liberal provision is the
one in Texas which allows a lawyer to advance "reasonably necessary medical and living
expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter...." TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. tit 2, subtit. G. app. A, art. 10, § 9, rule 1.8 (d) (Vemon 1998). The Texas rule
does not, on its face, preclude using promises to advance living expenses as a way of competing
for clients. However, no Texas court or administrative tribunal has ever interpreted the rule to so
authorize. Seven additional Jurisdictions expressly authorize financial assistance, but, in efforts
to avoid bidding wars, have carefully circumscribed the rules to ensure that "no promise or
assurance of financial assistance [be] made to the client... prior to the employment of the
lawyer." See ALA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT L8(e)(3) (2002); RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF
THE STATE BAR OF CAL. 4-210(A)(2) (2000); see also D.C. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8 cmt.
(2002) (where, in official comment, the Court of Appeals cautioned that the "provision does not
permit lawyers to 'bid' for clients by offering financial payments beyond those minimum
payments necessary to sustain the client," and that loans be made only "after employment");
MINNESOTA RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8 (e)(3) (1999); Miss. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT
1.8(e)(2) (2002); MONT. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT L8(e)(3) (1999); N.D. RULE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 1.8(e)(3) (2000);WOLFRAM, supra note 126, at 509 n.89 (stating that California courts
have interpreted the rule as forbidding attorneys to discuss the availability of loans before
representation begins).
One state, Louisiana, authorizes financial assistance to clients in a limited capacity, despite
its code language prohibiting the practice. See LA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(e) (2002). The
Louisiana Supreme Court allows attorneys to loan reasonably necessary living expenses to clients
only if "the advances were not promised as an inducement to obtain professional employment,
nor made until after the employment relationship was commenced ... and the attorney did not
encourage public knowledge of this practice as an inducement to secure representation of others."
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 446 (La. 1976); See also Chittenden v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Company, 788 So.2d 1140 (La. 2001). The Court noted that
"[njotwithstanding the wording of Rule L8(e), the current practice of law in our State follows the
Edwins policy of allowing an attorney to advance funds under the constraints enunciated in
Edwins," yet cautioning the bar "on the need for scrupulous adherence to the RPC so as to avoid
ethical problems which may appear almost unnoticed in their practice." Id. at 1146 (emphasis
added), 1152. Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court, in allowing an attorney to make a small loan
to a destitute client, warned, "[0]f course, the loan should not be the consideration for the
employment." See In re Sizer, 267 S.W. 922, 928 (Mo. 1924); see also In re Berlant, 328 A.2d
471, 479 (Pa. 1974) (Manderino, J., concurring and dissenting) (discipline of an attorney who
advanced living expenses was appropriate because the advance was designed to influence the
client to retain the attorney).
'^0 See Attorney Grievance Committee v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (Md. 1989) ("An
important public policy interest is to avoid unfair competition among lawyers on the basis of their
expenditures to clients. Clients should not be influenced to seek representation based on the ease
with which monies can be obtained
"); In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (Ariz. 1979) ("[T]he
practice of making advances to clients, if publicized, would constitute an improper inducement
for clients to employ an attorney. . .. [BJetween a lawyer who offers such an agreement and a
lawyer who does not, the client will choose the lawyer who offers the lesser financial
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otherwise. In the absence of such a prohibition, lawyers would be
expected to bid against each other through offers of financial assistance,
based upon the anticipated value of the claim.This would drive
contingent fee rates down, effectively forcing lawyers to divide rents
with their clients. Indeed, for many high value claims in which there is
no meaningful risk, lawyers could be expected to offer to pay
substantial sums, in some cases of low risk and high reward, as much as
hundreds of thousands of dollars to claimants as signing bonuses.'^^
2.

Prohibitions Against Brokerage of Lawyers' Services

One business structure that we would expect to emerge if the
contingent fee market were competitive is the legal practice equivalent
of mortgage brokerage, a business structure which arose after the home
mortgage market was deregulated. Mortgage brokers intermediate
between borrowers and banks, offering to evaluate the borrower's
financial circumstances, recommend and obtain the lowest bank
mortgage loan rates available to the lender and further facilitate the
lending process.Because of economies of scale, they are able to
obligation ...
1^1 See, e.g.. Attorney AAA v. The Mississippi Bar, 735 So.2d 294, 299 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(restrictions against providing financial assistance to clients "are rationally related to the
legitimate interest of the state in avoiding bidding wars"); Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671
So. 2d. 1293, 1298 (Miss. 1996) ("[U]nregulated lending to clients [to provide financial
assistance while a tort claim is being pursued] would generate unseemly bidding wars for
cases...."); Kentucky Bar Association, Op. E-375 (1995) (reaffirming the state's ban on
advances for living and medical expenses after noting that "dropping the time-honored rule will
invite bidding by lawyers for clients"); see also Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 19, at 107
n.317.
182 See, e.g., Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn. 131-37
(discussing the client recruitment efforts that took place after the 1989 Alton, Texas school bus
tragedy and its legal aftermath. Anticipating effective hourly rates of $25,000 and more in a case
where there was virtually no liability risk and little effort to be required, lawyers converged on
Alton to sign up clients). Though it was both imethical and illegal to do so, lawyers "bid" for
clients by offering various signing bonuses. See Paul Marcotte, Barratry Indictments: DA Claims
Four Texas Lawyers Solicited Bus-Crash Clients, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 21 (stating that a client
was offered $5000 cash and a new house by one attorney and a new GMC suburban van by
another); Lisa Belkin, Where 21 Youths Died, Lawyers Wage a War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990,
at A1 (reporting the investigation of more than 15 lawyers for the possibility that they "gained
cases by misleading or bribing families"). Lawyers did not, however, bid for clients on the basis
of price. In this riskless, "sure thing" reward scenario, they charged contingency fees ranging
from thirty to forty-five percent. See id. (reporting contingency fee rates as high as forty-five
percent); James Pinkerton and Glen Golightly, The Spoils of Tragedy: Profiting on Disaster,
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 2, 1992, at Al (reporting rates of thirty to forty percent).
183 See Robert Buss, Use Caution in Picking a Mortgage Broker, CHI. TRIE., Nov. 13, 1998, at
2G (stating that mortgage brokers act as middlemen during the real estate loan process, taking
borrowers' applications, shopping them around to various lenders seeking the best loan terms,
and finally collecting a commission for a successful matchmaking). For how mortgage brokers
operate, see Edwin McDowell, A Booming Business in Selling Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001,
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obtain discounted mortgage rates from banks and other lenders which
they pass on to borrowers, thereby underselling the very same banks
and lenders.They derive income from fees paid directly by the
borrowers but primarily from commissions paid by the lending banks.
In a competitive contingency fee/personal injury market we would
expect a similar structure to be replicated: the contingent fee-lawyer
broker.
The hypothetical "The Personal Injury People, Inc." ("PIP") is an
example of such a structure. Seizing upon the public's recognition of
the high degree of specialization in all forms of law practice, including
contingent fee practice, and the public's paucity of knowledge about the
quality of individual contingency fee lawyers, PIP would advertise that
it evaluates personal injury tort claims and if it concludes that a claim
has value, it refers the injured person to a competent lawyer who
specializes in that type of claim, e.g., supermarket slip-and-fall, landlord
liability, defective automobiles, toxic exposures, medical malpractice,
etc. PIP would claim that it has specialized knowledge not otherwise
available to a claimant that enables PIP to refer the claimant to more
highly competent attorneys than the claimant would likely be able to
obtain through his own efforts. In this hypothetical model, PIP does
not charge the claimant a fee for this triage service; instead, PIP collects
a fee from the law firm to which the matter is referred in the form of a
percentage of the fee that the referred law firm charged against any
recovery. Since PlP's fee would likely be about one third of the
referred lawyer's one third fee, i.e., one ninth of the recovery, PIP may
further advertise that it will rebate a portion, e.g., one half of its one
ninth referral fee, to the claimant if there is a successful outcome, thus
undercutting the prices charged virtually all contingent fee clients.
More ominously, if PlP's business model proved successful and it
began to refer large numbers of claimants to lawyers, and its success led
other contingent-fee-lawyer brokerages to be formed, PIP would likely
seek to maintain its market share by bargaining with some of the law
firms to give a volume discount in the form of a lowering of their
standard contingency fee rates for PIP customers. If it succeeded in
doing so, then PIP might further advertise that not only was it able to
secure higher quality specialized personal injury representation than
individuals could on their own but that PIP customers would be charged
lower than standard contingency fee rates. PlP's business model would

at § 11, 1; Jane Bryant Quinn, Mortgage Shopping Still Wise for Home Buyers, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
17, 1990, at Bus. 9. The business of brokering borne mortgages arose in the aftermath of the
deregulation of the home mortgage industry. See Brokers Look for the Best Deal, EVENING POST
(Wellington, Australia) (predicting a rise in the number of mortgage brokers in Australia, as has
occurred in the U.S., due, in large part, to the deregulation of the banking industry).
184 5ee BARRON'S, June 27, 1988, at 81.

2003]

CONTINGENT FEE TORT LITIGATION

123

thus likely lead to price competition , and at least a fair amount of
discounting by contingent fee lawyers from standard rates.
To ward off such price competition that would be engendered by
PIP, the bar has promulgated ethics rules essentially prohibiting forprofit "lawyer referral services"—the term it uses to refer to the
brokering of lawyers' services—and restricting not-for-profit lawyer
referral services to those which pose no threat of price competition.'^^
185 The Model Code promulgated in 1963, the Model Rules promulgated in 1983, and the
Model Rules as amended in August 2002 [hereinafter NEW RULES] have provisions regulating
lawyer referral services and will be considered seriatim.
DR 2-103(B) (1980) of the Model Code provides:
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to
recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a
recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may pay the
usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2103(D).
Id. DR 2-103(D) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm
may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with, one of the
following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm. . .: (3) A
lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association ....
Id.
Numerous advisory opinions of state and city bar associations purport to interpret these
Model Code provisions which essentially prohibit for-profit lawyer referral services and restrict
not-for-profit entities to those that do not pose a threat of facilitating price competition. See, e.g.,
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1510 (1985) (participation in a
for-profit lawyer referral service, even were there was no payment by participating lawyers,
would be a violation of a literal application of the Model Code); Ala. Ethics, Op. RO-86-81
(1986) (giving discounts from usual rates in exchange for participation in a lawyer referral service
would be valuable consideration, and thus unethical); Idaho, Formal Op. No. 114 (1985)
(prohibiting a lawyer from paying a fee to join a private attomey referral service not sanctioned
nor sponsored by the state bar association); Iowa Ethics, Op. 89-42 (1990) (considering the
propriety of a law firm joining a referral program where, in exchange for being placed on the
referral list, the firm "would agree to provide a free one-half hour consultation and legal services
thereafter at a 25 percent reduction of [its] regular fees." Although the firm would not be eharged
any enrollment or processing fees to participate, the ethics committee opined that discounting its
fee in exchange for participation would be a violation of D.R. 2-I03(B)); Me. Prof 1 Ethics
Comm'n, Op. 87 (8/31/88) (opining that a lawyer referral service for personal injury claimants
privately operated by lawyers which would either charge participating attomeys or split fees on
referred matters, would violate Maine Bar Rule 3.9(f)(2) which essentially replicates DR 2-103
(D)(3) prohibiting a lawyer from compensating another for recommending his services). But see
Neb., Op. No. 87-2 (1987) (reduced fees in exchange for participation in a for-profit service does
not constitute valuable consideration, and thus participation is not inherently imethical); Ohio
Grievance, Disciplinary Op. 2002-1 (2002) (improper for a law firm to pay an aimual fee to a real
estate agency and offer discotmted rates to clients referred to the firm by the agency in exchange
for the agency's promoting the law firm as a service provider).
In 1983, the Model Rules replaced the Model Code and the operative language dealing
with lawyer referral services was changed. Rule 7.2(c) provides "[a] lawyer shall not give
anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services except that a lawyer
may... (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal serviee
organization ...." Id.
While the operative language broadens the arena of permitted not-for-profit lawyer referral
services from those "operated, sponsored or approved by a bar association" to those "not-for-
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profit lawyer referral service[s] or legal service organization[s]," the net effect of the change is
modest. Advisory opinions interpreting this language indicate a somewhat broader range of
permissible not-for-profit lawyer referral services but none that would pose a threat of price
competition. See, e.g.. Pa. Bar Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility,
Informal Op. No. 90-42 (1990) ($500 fee paid by referred lawyer to referral service excessive and
a violation of Rule 7.2 (c) even though the service was not-for-profit); Wis., E-87-7 (1987)
(lawyer may accept referrals from legal services organization so long as he pays no consideration
for potential or actual receipt of clients through the service). For-profit lawyer referral services
remain essentially prohibited unless the business model poses no threat of price competition. See,
e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-1510 (as long as lawyers
did not pay a fee, they could ethically participate in a for-profit corporate lawyer referral service
where the corporation provided "a variety of 'professional-type services' to its subscribers for the
price of a $75.00 membership card"); Pa. Bar Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics and Profl
Responsibility, Informal Op. No. 90-49 (1990) (membership in a for-profit lawyer referral service
is unethical under the plain language of Rule 7.2).
Utah's formulation of Rule 7.2(c)(2) (2002) differs from the Model Rule by omitting the
words "not-for-profit." Nevertheless, for-profit referral was still essentially prohibited in Utah
State Bar Ethics, Advisory Op. No. 01-02 (2002), where the following question was presented:
A Utah lawyer referral service charges a referral fee to participating lawyers. It also
charges a referral fee to its customers who are referred to lawyers. In order to make its
business more appealing to the general public and businesses, the referral service also
asks each participating lawyer to discovmt by 10 percent the lawyer's usual fees to a
referred client until the client is credited with an amount equal to the referral fee that
the client paid to the referral service. Because not all participating lawyers agree to
discount their legal fees, the referral service caimot guarantee to its customers that their
referral fees will be reimbursed to them through the proposed payment arrangement.
Id. The Committee assumed that the referral service in question was provided by non-lawyers,
and allowed that lawyers may pay a fee to a lawyer referral service "so long as that fee is not
calculated on a per-referral basis." Id. However, the Committee found that a 10 percent discoimt
to the client is a direct payment, which "seems to serve as a pretext for avoidance of the
prescriptions of Rule 7.2(c)" and is therefore unethical. Id.
For-profit lawyer referral services have gained some approbation from ethics committees
where the for-profit entity is a law firm which, as part of its practice of law, refers clients to other
attomeys in exchange for a "referral fee," that is, a rebate of part of the fee collected by the
referred attorney. The operative language in NEW RULES 1.5 provides in relevant part:
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will
receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Id. Under rule 1.5, law firms can divide fees in referred cases provided the requirements of the
Rule are met. For puiposes of determining the ethical validity of the PIP business model, the
relevant ethics opinions are those focusing on whether law firms can create special purpose
entities devoted entirely to referrals and whether law firms can be created which limit their
activity solely to referrals. In this regard, see Conn., Ethical Op. 01-03 (1/22/01) (approving
paying part of a fee by a referred attorney to a for-profit lawyer referral business established and
operated by a law firm but as a separate entity). Only one advisory opinion condones the creation
of a lawyer referral service whereby the law firm's sole business is to provide referrals. See
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Op. 93-13 (1993), which addresses the question:
Inquirer represents an attomey who is contemplating starting a for profit attomey
referral business to assist members of the public in finding an attomey. A prospective
client would not pay a fee to the referral service. The law firm which was retained
would pay a referral fee to the referral service for any matters referred by the service to
it.
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Under the banner of ethies rules, the bar has declared the PIP model,
R.I.P.186

Id. The Committee found that so long as the business started was not something other than a
professional corporation, Rule 1.5(e) would allow this fee splitting arrangement amongst lawyers.
The American Bar Association has recently amended the Model Rules, including the rules
regulating lawyer referral services. Rule 7.2, as amended, provides:
(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer's services except that a lawyer may:
. . . (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified
lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service
that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority. .. .
Id. Comment 6 to amended Rule 7.2 provides:
A lawyer referral service ... is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a
lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by laypersons to be
consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with
appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other
client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements.
Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-forprofit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that
is approved by an appropriate regulatory authority as affording adequate protections
for prospective clients.
Id. Thus, the amended language is more explicit than the previous version of the Rule in
prohibiting for-profit lawyer referral service and would appear to be inconsistent with
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n. Op. 93-13 (1993), which approved a for-profit lawyer referral service
provided that it was operated solely by lawyers. A member of the "Ethics 2000" Commission,
which drafted most of the amendments to the Model Rules but not Rule 7.2—the latter changes
were drafted by the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility—explains that
the amendment allowing referred lawyers to make payments to a service "'approved by an
appropriate regulatory authority'" was meant to "conform the rule more closely to ABA policy
favoring expanded consumer access to legal services, while at the same time protecting
prospective clients" in the hope that, inter alia, "states will establish a regulatory mechanism that
ensures unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience ...." See Margaret Colgate
Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics
2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 472 (2002). But it will be easier for a for-profit lawyer
referral services to pass through the head of a pin than for them to gain the approbation of the
"appropriate regulatory authority" which presumably would be state supreme courts or their
delegees. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility: Report to the
House of Delegates, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics-72_75.doc (last visited Nov. 7,
2002) (noting that actual payment by a referred lawyer to a nonlawyer professional is prohibited).
Indeed, were state legislatures to set up regulatory authorities to "ensure unbiased referrals to
lawyers". Love, supra, most state supreme courts would strike down such actions as infringing
upon the exclusive authority of state supreme courts to regulate the practice of law. See Charles
W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II: The Modern
Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 212-13 (2002).
While ethical codes do not directly apply to non-lawyer entities such as for-profit lawyer
referral services operated by lay persons or combinations of lay persons and lawyers, referring
lawyers are prohibited from paying the entity a share of the fee obtained since that would violate
Rule 7.2(c) and its replacement. Rule 7.2(b)(2), as well as the prohibition of fee-splitting with a
nonlawyer as set forth in Rule 5.4.
Finally, the act of determining whether a potential claim should be referred to lawyer A
versus B would almost certainly be found to be the practice of law. Accordingly, a for-profit
lawyer referral service that was not a law firm would almost certainly be found to be in violation
of state laws prohibiting the imauthorized practice of law. For a discussion of the anticompetitive
effect of such laws, see Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
665,726-29; Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.41 (1986).
186 Requiescat In Pace (rest in peace) is a prayer for the repose of a dead person.
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The Effects of These Impediments And Restriction

Absent these structural impediments and ethical restrictions, which
are means of "maintaining rents for members of the legal profession,"'^''
it is likely that price competition in the market for tort claiming services
would arise, thereby improving client welfare.
CONCLUSION
The evidence and analysis presented in this article supports the
thesis that the market for tort claiming services is not price competitive.
A variety of indicia of an uncompetitive market have been considered
including uniform pricing unjustified by considerations of efficiency or
reduction in agency costs, price inelasticity in the face of highly
variable production costs and rewards, the level of increase over the
past 40 years in the inflation adjusted effective hourly rate realized by
tort lawyers and the historical derivation of the standard contingent fee.
Factors which inhibit the emergence of a competitive market have
been identified including asymmetrical information with regard to the
value of tort claims and quality of lawyering services, daunting if not
prohibitive search costs, and price cutting as signaling an inferior or
shirking lawyer. In addition, impediments to price competition imposed
by the bar have been considered, including barriers to entry, the
prohibition of the outright purchase of tort claims, and the use of ethical

Santore & Viard, supra note 130, at 570.
188 Sgg
("absent . . . [such] ethical restrictions, competition removes the rents [t]hat
constraints on competition create and client welfare is improved") One commentator has
dismissed the relevance of this analysis to tort reform efforts which seek to coimteract the
outcomes of lawyers' self-interested strategies, noting that while "the obvious implication of their
work is that the rules prohibiting purchase of claims and financing of clients' living expenses
should be repealed... [b]ecause critics of plaintiffs' attorneys want more regulation, not
deregulation, Santore and Viard's article gives them little comfort." Silver, supra note 38, at
2093. This critique is overstated. The "rules" that Santore and Viard implicitly criticize are those
prohibiting both the full ptu"chase of tort claims and of providing plaintiffs with financial
assistance for living expenses. As one of the "critics of plaintiffs' attorneys" referred to by
Silver, 1 do indeed favor the repeal of these anti-competitive rules, contrary to Silver's broad
sweeping proposition. However, it does not therefore follow that 1 am necessarily in favor of
"more regulation" to ciue contingency fee abuses. 1 am quite content to enforce current
regulations, for example, by adopting the "early offer" proposal referred to supra notes 36 and
156, and also in Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 1 at nn. 265-68, which "increase[s]
rather than diminish[es] consumer rights,. . . require[s] lawyers to comply with ethics rules[s]. ..
[and] alter[s]. . . perverse incentives that encourages lawsuits rather than settlements." See
Michael J. Horowitz, The Road To Reform, NAT'L REV., Aug. 20, 2001, at 31. Indeed, the "early
offer" proposal may be seen to emulate the structure that would occur if there were a competitive
market for contingent fee financed tort claiming services.
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rules to prevent price competition including prohibitions against
providing financial assistance to clients and brokerage of lawyers'
services.
Perhaps the most controversial argument I advance to explain the
lack of price competition is that lawyers act collusively to maintain a
uniform price,aided in that endeavor by a variety of other
mechanisms listed above. This assertion is inferred from the fact of
uniform pricing coupled with the lack of altemative viable explanations.
A more solid basis for the assertion, such as empirical data, would be
desirable but I have none to offer.
The explanations I offer for why the market for tort claiming
services is not price competitive have a more solid basis. Even here,
however, my analysis does not suffice to explain why no competitive
models have evolved. Most especially, why tort lawyers do not
compete against each other on the basis of price by advertising that they
will offer, in select (lucrative) cases, to charge a contingency fee of zero
on any amount of recovery up to $X and a standard contingent fee on
any amount of recovery above $X, where X is a variable representing
each lawyer's view about the amount of recovery that is virtually
certain.None of the structural impediments or ethical restrictions 1
consider would appear to preclude advertising such a fee structure.
Here, too, 1 have to fall back to the less-than-satisfying explanation of
collusive behavior to account for the failure of such a fee-setting device
from having been introduced into the market for tort claiming services.
Whatever the explanation for the absence of competitive pricing in
the tort claiming market, there is little reason to expect price
competitive behavior to emerge in the immediately foreseeable future.
The only way that the barriers that have been erected or which arise as
part of the operation of the market may be overcome is by regulation of
tort lawyers' behavior.
In theory, the market for tort claiming services is already regulated.
Contingent fees are subject to both ethical rules and fiducial principles
which limit such fees to "reasonable" amounts.'^' In practice, however,
the regulatory regimes have proven to be largely devoid of content'
and serve mostly to displace more effective regulation from outside the
bar.
The regulatory change that should be first considered is one that
would emulate the market bargain that would result if lawyers competed
with each other on the basis of price—as they do in airline crash

189 Sgg supra text accompanying nn.123-24.
19" This is the method described supra note 173.
191
notes 19-21.
192 See supra note 26.

128

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

litigation.
That is, a fee agreement in which lawyers would not apply
the standard contingency fee to the value of a claim that existed prior to
the lawyer adding value to the elaim; instead, the lawyer would apply a
standard (or a variable) contingent fee only to the amount of any
recovery added to the value of the claim as it existed before the lawyer's
efforts augmented the claim value.
For such a regulatory approach to be implemented, it would have
to be self-effectuating, require no additional bureaucracy for its
enforcement and impose no significant transactional costs. These
attributes are achieved in the "early offer" proposal that others and I
have advanced.'®'* The proposal would prohibit plaintiff lawyers in
personal injury cases from charging standard contingency fees where
alleged responsible parties made early settlement offers before the
lawyer added any significant value to the claim. Instead, the lawyer
would be restricted to charging an hourly rate fee for the effort required
to notify the allegedly responsible party of the relevant details of the
claim. If an early settlement offer were rejected and a subsequent
settlement or judgment was obtained, the lawyer would apply a
contingent percentage to the amount in excess of the early offer.
While this proposal, intended for adoption by state legislatures as
an anti-price gouging consumer protection statute and by state supreme
courts as part of the ethical code regulating lawyers' behavior,'®^ would
only address a small configuration of the problem identified, it would
nonetheless constitute a significant step towards wresting control of the
tort claiming market from those who impose limits on price competition
and benefit from its absence.

1®3 5ee
section v.
194 See BRICKMAN ET AL.. RETHINKING FEES, supra note 156; see also supra notes 36 & 156;
see generally Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal For
Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173 (1995).
'9^ See Adam Liptak, In 13 States, A United Push to Limit Fees of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2003, at AlO.

